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ONE SIZE FITS SOME: SINGLE ASSET REAL
ESTATE BANKRUPTCY CASESt
Kenneth N. Kleett
For several years a debate has raged over whether single asset real estate
cases should be singled out for special treatment under the Bankruptcy Code.
Under the current $4 million debt cap, these cases involve apartment houses
and small office buildings. But both Houses of Congress have passed legisla-
tion that will repeal the $4 million cap, potentially subjecting large office
buildings, shopping centers, and perhaps hotels to expedited discriminatory
treatment in Chapter 11 reorganization cases. In this Article, Professor Klee
attempts to inform the debate by presenting empirical data gathered from a
national questionnaire and cross-checking the data against the case files of a
bankruptcy judge in the most active judicial district in the country. The
results are striking. Asset values rather than amounts owing stand out as
reliable predictors of plan confirmation. Surprisingly, value-to-loan ratios
are less reliable than asset values standing alone. The data show that valu-
able properties have a much greater probability of confirming a plan than
less valuable properties. The Article suggests that if Congress desires to dis-
criminate against single asset real estate debtors, it should draw the line at
approximately $7-$8.2 million in asset value rather than changing current
law to discriminate against all single asset real estate debtors.
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INTRODUCTION
Congressional shortcuts can cut short the rights of Chapter 111
real property owners and investors. 2 Shortcuts rely on generalizations
that sacrifice accuracy and precision for the sake of expedience. 3 In
fashioning a shortcut, the guide is usually inductive logic: If a shortcut
works for a few cases, it will likely work in many cases. Inductive logic
often rests on assumptions based on limited observations, but a short-
cut rarely relies on systematic and expensive empirical research.
Absent an emergency, legislators can afford to engage in empiri-
cal research, but seldom do.4 This Article discusses one piece of fed-
eral legislation that could have benefitted from a small amount of
empirical research, which would have likely resulted in a more effi-
cient statutory amendment.
1 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (2000).
2 See, e.g., infra Part IV (arguing that the congressional shortcut in removing the $4
million cap on single asset real estate (SARE) cases will harm property owners and
investors).
3 Commentators have analyzed and criticized courts' use of shortcuts to resolve se-
curities law cases. See Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize?
(The Same Way Eveybody Else Does-Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51
EMORY LJ. 83, 87 (2002) (concluding that judges use substantive heuristics to dispose of
securities law cases at the motion to dismiss stage); see generally Hillary A. Sale, Judging
Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAvIs L. Rv. 903 (2002).
4 It is a matter of conjecture whether legislators are too busy to cause their staffs, the
General Accounting Office, or the Congressional Research Service to engage in empirical
research or whether legislators prefer to respond to lobbying pressures without the burden
of hard data that might undercut the lobbyists' legislative objectives. On some occasions,
Congress has commissioned studies before legislating a solution to a perceived problem,
and did so with respect to other aspects of the pending Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001.
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY: ANALYSIS OF FOUR REPORTS ON
CHAPTER 7 DEBTORS' ABILITY TO PAY, No. GAO/GGO-99-103 (1999), available at http://
www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99103.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2002). As a norm, however,
policymakers typically have a full legislative agenda that covers a wide range of topics, and
have little taste for delving into the kinds of minutiae necessary to produce high-quality
empirical research. Moreover, to the extent that legislation responds to interest group
lobbying, a friendly legislator sees little to gain from developing data that would suggest
that her supporters are pushing for something unwise.
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In 2001, each House of Congress passed a so-called "technical
amendment ' 5 (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "2001
Amendment") repealing the $4 million cap in the definition of "single
asset real estate" (SARE). 6 Before the 2001 Amendment, SARE cov-
ered most apartment houses, very small office buildings, and strip-
mall shopping centers. 7 If the 2001 Amendment becomes law and
eliminates its dollar limitation, SARE will cover large office buildings,
such as Rockefeller Plaza, and possibly hotels and casinos.8 This tech-
nical amendment will subject large real estate projects with complex
capital structures and operating problems to the same reorganization
process as a five-unit apartment house. Most importantly, the 2001
Amendment eliminates an important protection the Bankruptcy Code
offers developers or owners with liquidity problems. In a SARE case,
the Bankruptcy Code permits a mortgage holder to obtain relief from
the automatic stay by commencing foreclosure a mere ninety days9
5 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 333,
107th Cong. § 1201(5) (B), available at http://thomas.loc.gov (amending the definition of
"single asset real estate" in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (B)); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420,
107th Cong. § 1201(5) (B), available at http://thomas.loc.gov (same). The House filed a
conference report on H.R. 333 onJuly 26, 2002. The conference report contains the provi-
sions referenced in this Article. At the time this Article went to press, the prospects for the
bill's passage remained unclear.
6 The current statutory definition reads as follows:
"[S]ingle asset real estate" means real property constituting a single prop-
erty or project, other than residential real property with fewer than 4 resi-
dential units, which generates substantially all of the gross income of a
debtor and on which no substantial business is being conducted by a debtor
other than the business of operating the real property and activities inci-
dental thereto having aggregate noncontingent, liquidated secured debts
in an amount no more than $4,000,000.
11 U.S.C. § 101(51B) (2000).
7 See, e.g., In re Syed, 238 B.R 133, 140 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999) (noting that "[t]he
phrase 'single-asset real estate' was intended in the statute to encompass an apartment
building, office building, or strip-mall shopping center"). "We commonly think of a single
asset case as one of a debtor with a single apartment house or condo complex or a single
piece of real estate." 138 CONG. Rsc. S8264 (daily ed. June 16, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Reid).
8 Whether the 2001 Amendment covers shopping complexes, office towers, hotels,
and casinos depends on whether courts find those properties to have substantial businesses
other than operating the real property and activities incidental thereto. See, e.g., Cento-
fante v. CBJ Dev., Inc. (In re CBJ Dev., Inc.), 202 B.R_ 467, 474 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that a full-service hotel is not SARE). Some courts will not interpret the SARE
definition to include a golf course or a golf and ski facility. See In re Prairie Hills Golf & Ski
Club, Inc., 255 B.R 228, 230 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2000) (holding that a golf and ski facility is
not SARE because it involves significant income-producing activities other than income-
producing buildings and land); In re Larry Goodwin Golf, Inc., 219 B.R. 391, 393 (Bankr.
M.D.N.C. 1997) (holding that a golf club is a "business" rather than SARE).
9 The court can extend the ninety-day period for "cause" by an order entered within
the ninety-day period. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (d) (3) (2000). However, forcing the debtor to
seek an extension is costly. Moreover, based on judges' different attitudes toward SARE
cases generally, the application of judicial discretion in this context is likely to lead to
disparate results in similar cases before differentjudges. See infra note 90 and accompany-
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after the order for relief, unless "the debtor has filed a plan of reor-
ganization that has a reasonable possibility of being confirmed within
a reasonable time," 10 or the debtor in possession11 has commenced
monthly payments equivalent to interest 12 to each secured creditor.1 3
If the 2001 Amendment becomes law, however, mortgage holders
can prematurely flush out of the bankruptcy system some large real
estate developers or owners that have liquidity problems before the
latter have a reasonable chance to reorganize.1 4 By threatening to do
so, mortgage holders can control the Chapter 11 process to their ben-
efit. They can decide whether to seize the property for potential up-
side gain or leave it in Chapter 11 to serve their other purposes. 15
Their benefit will come at the expense of property owners, general
unsecured creditors, and the public that subsidizes the cost of operat-
ing the bankruptcy system to achieve a public good.
After testifying before Congress about the forerunner of the 2001
Amendment, I recognized the desirability of gathering empirical data
to determine whether large SARE debtors differed from small SARE
debtors in their Chapter 11 experiences. I examined the case law and
gathered information in unreported cases to determine whether
SARE debtors confirmed Chapter 11 plans. By analyzing plan confir-
mation rates over the past twenty years, this Article tests the wisdom of
ing text (discussing the uncertainty of an extension motion due to judicial hostility toward
SARE debtors).
10 11 U.S.C. § 362 (d) (3) (A).
11 Although the statute refers to a "debtor," it actually means a "debtor in possession"
acting as the legal representative of the bankruptcy estate. See id. §§ 323(a), 1107(a).
12 Some courts and commentators mistakenly characterize the statute as requiring the
payment of interest. Rather, the payments are "in an amount equal to interest." See id.
§ 362(d) (3) (B). Unless the creditor is oversecured or the debtor is solvent, the statute
forbids the payment of postpetition interest. See id. §§ 502(b) (2), 506(b), 726(a) (5). In
fact, if the creditor is oversecured, although postpetition interest will accrue under
§ 506(b), the statute might forbid the payment of postpetition interest prior to the conclu-
sion of the case as well. See Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Delta Res., Inc. (In re Delta Res.,
Inc.), 54 F.3d 722, 730 (lth Cir. 1995).
13 See 11 U.S.C. §362(d)(3)(B).
14 See In re Kkemko, Inc., 181 B.R. 47, 49 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995) (noting that the
purpose of § 362(d) (3) is to "impose an expedited time frame for filing a [confirmable]
plan" in SARE cases); David B. Young, Automatic Stay Issues: Selected Recent Developments, in 2
23rd ANNUAL CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION 9, 71 (PLI
Commercial Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. A-820, 2001) ("11 U.S.C.
§ 362(d) (3) ... seeks to place the debtor on a fast track and to permit the mortgage lender
to foreclose unless the debtor acts swiftly.").
15 That is why mortgage holders financed the lobbying effort to press for this amend-
ment. See generally Bankruptcy, at http://wwnv.opensecrets.org/news/bankruptcy/in-
dex.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2002) (indicating that during the 1999-2000 lobbying cycle,
finance and credit card companies contributed $9 million, and that during the same cycle,
commercial banks contributed $29 million, and credit unions contributed $2.1 million-
almost two and a half times the amount spent by this industry during the 1996 presidential
campaign).
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treating large and small SARE debtors alike in a manner different
from all other Chapter 11 debtors.
Part I of this Article examines the history and policy behind SARE
reorganization and asks a threshold question: Why should SARE debt-
ors have the opportunity to reorganize at all? Compelling policy rea-
sons favor reorganization of SARE debtors, even though theories of
allocative efficiency might indicate otherwise. Part II reviews the 2001
Amendment's uniform procedure for all SARE reorganizations by
changing the definition of SARE to eliminate the $4 million cap and
analyzes the policies that the amendment implicates. Part III dis-
cusses original data analyzing real estate cases to see how they fared in
bankruptcy and finds that larger SARE debtors above the $4 million
cap have higher Chapter 11 confirmation rates. In Part IV, this Article
argues that these findings do not justify Congress's proposal to repeal
the SARE $4 million cap because Chapter 11 functions well for larger
SARE debtors. Congress acted on the basis of a hunch instead of do-
ing its homework.
I
WHY REORGANIZE SARE CASES AT ALL?
The question whether or under what conditions single asset real
estate cases should be able to reorganize under the Bankruptcy Code
requires an evaluation of the costs and benefits of reorganization as
compared to foreclosure under state law. To place the evaluation in
context, this Part begins with a brief history of real property reorgani-
zations and describes how Chapter 11 reorganization cases work. It
examines the arguments for and against allowing SARE cases access to
Chapter 11 at all and focuses on the political motivations that led to
the adoption of the 2001 Amendment rather than exclusion of SARE
debtors from Chapter 11.
A. The History of Real Property Reorganization Cases
During the 1930s, the deteriorating economic climate in the
United States led to massive defaults in the repayment of real property
mortgages.1 6 Economic disaster threatened not only the debtors who
owed mortgage obligations, but also the financial institutions, particu-
larly savings banks, that held the mortgages. 17 As debtors defaulted,
16 See Homer F. Carey, Real Property: Post Depression and Future, J. LEcAL & POL. Soc.,
Apr. 1943, at 101, 101 ("Foreclosures reached staggering proportions [from 1931 to 1935]
and bankruptcies were occurring at an ever accelerating rate.").
17 See ELMUS WICKER, THE BANKING PANICS OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION 16 (1996) ("Real
estate lending, primarily nonfarm .... was an important source of unsettled banking mar-
kets during the Great Depression."); Milton Esbitt, Bank Portfolios and Bank Failures During
the Great Depression: Chicago, 46 J. EcON. Hisr. 455, 457 (1986) ("[F]ully 95% of the bank
troubles in Chicago were predicated on real estate." (internal quotation marks omitted));
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mortgage holders commenced foreclosure proceedings and financial
institutions began to hold record title to enormous amounts of real
property.18 Many of these financial institutions faced the Hobson's
choice of holding real estate that generated little income but carried
tax, maintenance, and insurance liabilities, or selling the real estate
into a thin market with few buyers and distressed prices. 19 Yet in
many states, financial institutions could not intervene to protect their
interests by foreclosing on mortgaged properties, because the states
had imposed moratorium laws to suspend foreclosures.20 As a result,
the United States faced the prospect of numerous financial institution
insolvencies. 21 In addition, Congress saw a risk of undermining the
U.S. economic system by allowing real property defaults to cause per-
vasive dispossession of private ownership. Partially to ameliorate this
situation, Congress enacted Chapter XII of the Bankruptcy Act to per-
mit individual and partnership debtors who owned real property the
opportunity to reorganize.2 2 By enacting Chapter XII, Congress cre-
Thomas S. Stone, Mortgage Moratoria, 11 Wis. L. REv. 203, 206 (1935) ("The wave of foreclo-
sures... was of little benefit to creditors."); Current Legislation, Emergency Mortgage Legisla-
tion, 8 ST. JoHNs L. REv. 204, 206 (1933) ("Savings banks and insurance companies with
their millions in mortgages ... were caught in the deluge of foreclosure and in this time of
chaos, President Roosevelt declared the Banking Holiday.").
18 See Carey, supra note 16, at 104 ("[P]roperty passed in great volume to the creditor
class during the interval from 1930 to 1937."). Contemporary literature contains the fol-
lowing hyperbole: "When one realizes that approximately 50 per cent of the farm lands in
Central and Northern California are controlled by one institution-the Bank of America-
the irony of these 'embittered' farmers defending their 'homes' against strikers becomes
apparent." CAREY McWILLIAMS, FACrORIES IN THE FIELD: THE STORY OF MIGRATORY FARI
LABOR IN CALIFORNIA 233 (1939).
19 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 17, at 206 ("[T]he past few years have found banks and
other lending institutions loaded down with physical properties which they cannot oper-
ate."); Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Foreclosure and Sale: Some Suggested Changes in the New York
Procedure, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 216, 217 (1937) ("The great lending institutions are reluctant
to load themselves with foreclosed real estate .... ").
20 See, e.g., Robert H. Skilton, Mortgage Moratoria Since 1933, 92 U. PA. L. REv. 53, 88
(1943) ("The chief criticism that may be made of the New York moratorium is that it was
too inclusive. Commercial properties... were protected against the consequences of de-
fault in principal."); see also William L. Prosser, The Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium, 7 S. CAL.
L. REv. 353, 355, 360-63 (1934) (discussing Minnesota's executive and legislative responses
to the wave of foreclosures and forced sales); Stone, supra note 17, at 219-20 (discussing
the Wisconsin Mortgage Moratorium Law of 1933); Current Legislation, supra note 17, at
206-09 (discussing New York's mortgage moratorium statutes).
21 See RaymondJ. Mischler, After the Mortgage Moratorium-What?, 19 IOWA L. REv. 560,
561 (1934) ("Foreclosures and forced sales were reaching proportions that threatened
state and national stability.").
22 See Morris W. Macey & M. William Macey, Jr., The Chapter XII Chrysalis, 52 Aai.
BANKR. L.J. 121, 123 (1978) ("Chapter XII was... developed principally to meet an emer-
gency situation prevalent in Illinois and, to some extent, Massachusetts."). Congress en-
acted Chapter XII as part of the Chandler Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, ch. XII, 52 Stat.
840, 916-30 (repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401, 92
Stat. 2549, 2682), and at the same time it passed Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act to
facilitate corporate reorganization of different kinds of businesses, including those owning
real property. See id. ch. X, 52 Stat. at 883-905 (repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1290 [Vol. 87:1285
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ated a beneficial legal mechanism to prevent financial institutions
from either conducting massive resales of foreclosed real estate into
depressed markets or retaining concentrated ownership of real prop-
erty on their balance sheets. Before the enactment of Chapter XII,
SARE debtors either renegotiated consensually with their mortgage
holders or liquidated the property under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
or state mortgage foreclosure laws.
When Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, it contin-
ued to permit SARE debtors to reorganize under the same laws and
rules as other kinds of Chapter 11 debtors. A property owner was eli-
gible to file for relief under Chapter 11 whether the owner was an
individual, partnership, or corporation. 23 The 1978 Bankruptcy Code
gave all kinds of SARE debtors a breathing spell to permit them to
restructure their property and their mortgage.
In 1994, however, the law changed fundamentally for some SARE
property owners when Congress adopted special rules for SARE debt-
ors with secured debts of less than $4 million ("small" SARE debtors).
In those cases, Congress restricted small SARE debtors to an expe-
dited Chapter 11 procedure designed to confirm a plan quickly or
force the debtor to pay the mortgage holder. Debtors who could do
neither faced losing their property to foreclosure. To protect mort-
gage lenders in SARE cases having secured debts not greater than $4
million,24 the 1994 amendments added an additional procedure by
which a real property mortgage holder could obtain relief from § 362
of the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay against lien foreclosure. 25
1978, § 401, 92 Stat. at 2682); see also Charlestown Sav. Bank v. Martin (In re Colonial Realty
Inv.), 516 F.2d 154, 158 (1st Cir. 1975). The court stated:
The power to prevent secured parties from availing of their contractual
remedies .... and to compel those creditors ... in possession at the time
of filing to return the debtor's property is essential to preserve the possibil-
ity of a successful rearrangement of the debtor's affairs. Little hope of re-
suscitation would remain for the debtor disembowelled just prior to filing.
Id.
23 Individuals (human beings), partnerships, and corporations are eligible to be
Chapter 11 debtors. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(41), 109(b), (d) (2000); Toibb v. Radioff, 501
U.S. 157, 166 (1991) (holding that an individual debtor not engaged in business was eligi-
ble to file under Chapter 11). See generally infra note 30 (discussing the meaning of the
terms "individual" and "corporation" in the Bankruptcy Code). Individual debtors with
regular income and noncontingent, liquidated secured debts less than $871,550 and non-
contingent, liquidated unsecured debts less than $290,525 may file Chapter 13 cases in-
stead of Chapter 11 cases. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2000) (as amended effective April 1,
2001). Generally, Chapter 13 cases are less expensive and more effective than Chapter 11
cases. Thus, an individual SARE debtor who is eligible might choose to file a Chapter 13
case instead of a Chapter 11 case. This Article assumes that the debtor files for relief under
Chapter 11.
24 For the Code's definition of "single asset real estate," see supra note 6.
25 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 218(b), 108 Stat. 4106,
4128 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) (2000)); see infra note 26. Lenders
with secured loans of at least $4 million did not receive the benefits of these protections,
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Section 362 (d) (3) permits a SARE mortgage holder to get relief from
the automatic stay to foreclose unless, within ninety days after the or-
der for relief, the debtor files a confirmable plan or begins making
monthly payments to the mortgage holder.26 Thus the amendments
minimize the mortgage holder's out-of-pocket loss by shortening the
Chapter 11 process or forcing the debtor to "pay to play" by making
cash payments to the lender. This shifts the risk of delay from the
secured lender to the debtor. It also creates a barrier to entry that
discourages small real estate owners from filing for Chapter 11 re-
lief.27 Mortgage holders and their lobbyists justified the provision
based on an alleged "shared experience" that, in most real estate
cases, debtors file solely to delay foreclosure. 28 They convinced Con-
although they could seek relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d) (1) or (2). See 11
U.S.C. § 362(d)(1)-(2). Presumably Congress adopted the $4 million cap in 1994 because
it thought that different policy concerns governed larger cases.
26 Section 362(d) (3) provides as follows:
[The court shall grant relief from the automatic stay of § 362(a)] (3) with
respect to a stay of an act against single asset real estate under subsection
(a), by a creditor whose claim is secured by an interest in such real estate,
unless, not later than the date that is 90 days after the entry of the order for
relief (or such later date as the court may determine for cause by order
entered within that 90-day period)-
(A) the debtor has filed a plan of reorganization that has a reasonable
possibility of being confirmed within a reasonable time; or
(B) the debtor has commenced monthly payments to each creditor
whose claim is secured by such real estate (other than a claim se-
cured by ajudgment lien or by an unmatured statutory lien), which
payments are in an amount equal to interest at a current fair market
rate on the value of the creditor's interest in the real estate.
11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (3).
27 One commentator believed that the 1994 amendments would cause the bankruptcy
courts to experience increased efficiency because the amendments would "minimize filings
where no real probability of confirmation exists." See Commercial and Credit Issues in Bank-
ruptcy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong. 89 (1991) [hereinafter Commercial and Credit Hearing] (statement of
MaryJane Flaherty). Although it is obvious that a debtor would prefer a ninety-day delay
to immediate foreclosure, as a matter of cost/benefit analysis, the foregoing speculations
appear to be sound. Debtors that own small real estate projects will be less inclined to pay
a bankruptcy attorney's retainer, a Chapter 11 filing fee, the quarterly U.S. trustee's fees,
and the other substantial incremental costs of filing for Chapter 11 when the limitations of
§ 362 (d) (3) operate to compress and restrict their opportunity to reorganize. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1930(a) (3), (6) (Supp. V 1999). At the margin, they will walk away and allow lenders to
foreclose or give lenders a deed to the property in lieu of foreclosure. Another commenta-
tor has speculated that the 1994 amendment would discourage small real estate debtors
from filing for Chapter 11 relief, thereby resulting in earlier foreclosures under state law.
SeeJohn C. Murray, The Lender's Guide to Single Asset Real Estate Bankruptcies, 31 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR.J. 393, 448 (1996).
28 See, e.g., Commercial and Credit Hearing, supra note 27, at 88-89 (statement of Mary
Jane Flaherty) ("The problem with single asset cases is that there is usually no reasonable
prospect of reorganization. The bankruptcy filing is simply used as a legal method to delay
foreclosure. Lenders typically receive relief from the stay, but only after substantial delay
and expense.").
1292
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gress that these cases seldom result in confirmed plans but instead use
the resources of the federal courts for improper dilatory purposes.29
In 2001, once again bowing to pressure from mortgage holders
and their lobbyists, each House of Congress introduced and passed
bills repealing the $4 million cap and subjecting all SARE debtors to
the expedited procedures that since 1994 had applied only to small
SARE debtors.
B. How Chapter 11 Functions for SARE Debtors
Before analyzing the 2001 Amendment, it is useful to understand
how Chapter 11 functions for SARE debtors and to consider whether
SARE cases should reorganize at all. Continuing the pattern of fed-
eral reorganization relief that started during the Great Depression,
the Bankruptcy Code allows almost any kind of SARE debtor to initi-
ate a Chapter 11 reorganization case, whether the debtor is an individ-
ual, partnership, or corporation.30 After filing a Chapter 11 petition,
the debtor ordinarily remains as a debtor in possession31 with the
29 See id.; Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. & Commercial Law of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 532 (1994) (statement of Warren Lasko, Exec-
utive Vice President, Mortgage Bankers Association of America) ("The survey also confirms
that Chapter 11 is being used by developers and owners of single asset real property for
delay, not for legitimate reorganization of a business."). The subcommittee manager of
the bill in the House of Representatives described the 1994 amendments as "designed to
curtail bankruptcy fraud and abuse and reduce the unnecessary costs and delays of the
bankruptcy process." 140 CONG. REc. H10,771 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Synar).
30 The Bankruptcy Code uses the term "individual" to mean a particular human be-
ing. See Farm Fresh Poultry, Inc. v. Hooton Co. (In re Hooton Co.), 43 B.R. 389, 391
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1984) ("The term 'individual' is not included in the definitions found in
11 U.S.C. § 101; however, it may be said to mean generally a single human being as distin-
guished from a social group or institution."); David Swarthout, Note, Vzen Is an Individual
a Corporation?--When the Court Misinterprets a Statute, That's When!, 8 Am. BANKR. INsT. L.
REv. 151, 152 n.9 (2000) (citing Toibb v. Radloff 501 U.S. 157, 160-61 (1991), for the
proposition that the Court's use of the term "individual" excludes "corporate debtors and
only refer[s] to human beings."). The Bankruptcy Code's definition of "corporation"
probably includes limited liability companies, limited liability partnerships, and business
trusts, but not true trusts. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) (2000) (defining "corporation"); Sally S.
Neely, Partnerships and Partners and Limited Liability Companies and Members in Bankruptcy:
Proposals for Reform, 71 Aum. BANKR. L.J. 271, 286 (1997) (stating that a LLC "appears to be a
corporation" under the Bankruptcy Code's definition of "corporation"); Thomas F. Blake-
more, Limited Liability Companies and the Bankruptcy Code: A Technical Review, Am. BANKR.
INST.J. (Am. Bankr. Inst., Wash., D.C.),June 1994, at 12 (stating that "a LLC would appear
to qualify as a 'corporation' under [Bankruptcy] Code § 101(9)").
31 See 11 U.S.C. § 1101 (1) (2000) (defining "debtor in possession" to mean the debtor
except when a trustee is serving in the case). It is rare for Chapter 11 trustees to be ap-
pointed or elected. See id. § 1104(a) (2000) (specifying grounds for the appointment of a
Chapter 11 trustee).
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power to operate its business, 3 2 sell assets, 3 3 obtain credit, 34 and pro-
pose a plan of reorganization. 35
For at least the last sixty years, most SARE debtors in bankruptcy
have had over-leveraged capital structures where a decline in rents (or
inability to rent) produces a cash flow insufficient to service their se-
cured debts. Some debtors have obtained junior mortgages to create
additional short-term cash flow, but this strategy often adds more debt
without solving the debtor's long-term liquidity crisis. Ultimately, the
liquidity crisis escalates to the point where the mortgage holder
threatens to foreclose and the debtor walks away from the property,
renegotiates with the mortgage holder out of court, or files a Chapter
11 petition. In these Chapter 11 cases, the debtor's plan of reorgani-
zation almost always proposes debt relief. Debt relief takes many
forms, ranging from a simple extension of the maturity date or an
adjustment of the interest rate or of the debt amortization period, to
forgiveness of indebtedness or the conversion of debt to either equity
or a participating mortgage. Indeed, a principal purpose of bank-
ruptcy is to give the debtor an opportunity to solve its liquidity
problems. 36
In some SARE cases, the borrower needs to restructure both the
secured debt and the business operations. For example, a building
might require construction for completion, expansion, retrofitting,
repair, or renovation. In this kind of SARE case, the debtor in posses-
sion first must obtain additional capital to finance the needed con-
struction in order to prove that its reorganization plan is feasible. If
the value of the property is less than the mortgage debt, the debtor in
possession probably will not obtain additional financing on an un-
secured basis or even with a junior lien for security. Sometimes the
debtor in possession obtains debtor in possession financing secured
by a senior lien on the property. 37 Most lenders, however, will not
provide financing to a postpetition debtor in possession unless the
debtor in possession secures the new credit with a so-called "priming"
32 See id. §§ 1107(a), 1108.
33 See id. § 363.
34 See id. § 364.
35 See id. § 1121 (a) (giving the debtor the right to file a plan).
36 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 221 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6180 ("The purpose of [a] reorganization... case is to formulate and have confirmed a
plan of reorganization... for the debtor."); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in
an Imperfect Worl 92 MICH. L. REv. 336, 372 (1993) (characterizing Chapter 11 as "creating
an opportunity for a business to survive its immediate financial crisis"). But see Kevin A.
Kordana & Eric A. Posner, A Positive Theory of Chapter 11, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 161, 164 (1999)
("We assume that the purpose of Chapter 11 is to minimize the cost of credit.").
-7 See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (giving the debtor in possession the ability to obtain postpeti-
tion financing).
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lien with priority ahead of the prepetition mortgages.3 8 The law per-
mits this to be done only if the court determines that there is ade-
quate protection of the prepetition mortgage holder's interest in the
real property.3 9 Although a value cushion is a common form of ade-
quate protection,40 where the amount of prepetition mortgage debt
exceeds the value of the property, this method of protection is un-
available. In some SARE cases, however, the value added by new con-
struction will provide a sufficient cushion to cover new postpetition
financing and adequately protect the prepetition mortgage holder's
interest in property.41 Even if the debtor in possession cannot obtain
debtor-in-possession financing, it may be possible for existing or new
equity owners to infuse equity capital under a reorganization plan.
Unless the prepetition mortgage holder votes to accept the plan, how-
ever, the equity owners may infuse equity only if the debtor uses a
market process to determine the value of the new equity.42
While the debtor in possession attempts to obtain debtor-in-pos-
session financing or new equity, the law automatically stays the se-
cured lender from pursuing its foreclosure rights.43 Although it is
possible for the debtor to make periodic cash payments to the lender
as a form of adequate protection, 44 not all courts require current pay-
ment of postpetition interest on prepetition mortgages.4 5 Under the
reorganization plan, unless the debtor is solvent, the undersecured
lender's claim will include principal and prepetition interest, but not
postpetition interest.46 For example, assume that a debtor owes a
mortgage holder $1 million under a note bearing annual interest at
10% and secured by real property worth $800,000. If the court con-
firms the reorganization plan and it is effective one year after the
38 See id. § 364(d).
39 See id. § 361; id. § 364(d)(1)(B).
40 See, e.g., Pistole v. Mellor (In re Mellor), 734 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1984); Mc-
Combs Props. VI, Ltd. v. First Tex. Say. Ass'n (In re McCombs Props. VI, Ltd.), 88 B.R. 261,
266 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988).
41 See, e.g., In re Ledgemere Land Corp., 125 B.R. 58, 63 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
42 See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434,
445-58 (1999) (holding that if the new value principle exists under the Bankruptcy Code,
it requires the equity to be exposed to a market value such as through an auction or the
termination of the debtor's plan exclusivity).
43 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000).
44 See id. § 361 (1).
45 See, e.g., Orix Credit Alliance v. Delta Res., Inc. (In re Delta Res., Inc.), 54 F.3d 722,
729 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that if the mortgage holder is oversecured, some courts per-
mit postpetition interest to accrue, but do not permit its payment until the conclusion of
the case). If the mortgage holder is undersecured, it might not have the right to payment
of postpetition interest as long as the value of the real property is not declining. See, e.g.,
United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 382 (1988)
(holding that the undersecured creditor is not entitled to adequate protection for the
delay in its foreclosure rights attributable to the automatic stay).
46 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(b) (2), 726(a) (5) (2000).
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bankruptcy filing, the mortgage holder will receive consideration
worth $800,000 on the effective date of the plan but will forgo
$100,000 in postpetition interest. Thus, bankruptcy may reduce the
undersecured mortgage lender's recovery on a present value basis
compared to what the lender would have received by pursuing its state
law rights.
C. Arguments For and Against Reorganization
We now discuss the fundamental question: Why should Congress
permit SARE cases to reorganize under Chapter 11? 47 Some commen-
tators have contended, or have adopted theoretical positions that
should lead them to contend, that the Chapter 11 process in SARE
cases is inefficient compared to the alternative of mandatory prompt
auctions.48 Allocative efficiency, they argue, requires swift and inex-
pensive foreclosure in accordance with state law. 49 These commenta-
tors contend that permitting the borrower to file a Chapter 11
petition inefficiently delays foreclosure, thereby imposing increased
costs on secured creditors. 50 Secured creditors in turn pass these
losses on to all borrowers in the form of higher interest rates.
Other commentators argue that bankruptcy law should permit in-
terference with state law only if it solves a "common pool problem."51
In their view, bankruptcy law is necessary to prevent one creditor from
acting in its own self-interest to the detriment of creditors as a
whole. 52 For example, the law properly prevents a creditor with a se-
curity interest in valuable machinery of an insolvent manufacturing
company from foreclosing on its security interest and causing the liq-
uidation of the debtor to the detriment of all other creditors. These
commentators argue that almost all SARE cases are two-party disputes
47 See, e.g., Young, supra note 14, at 59 ("It is at least arguable that single asset real
estate debtors do not belong in a reorganization proceeding at all.").
48 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, 17J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 356, 371 (2001).
49 See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Critiquing the Foreclosure Process: An Economic Approach Based
on the Paradigmatic Norms of Bankruptcy, 79 VA. L. Rv. 959, 989 (1993). Johnson explains:
The ability of a lender to foreclose on a mortgage in an inexpensive and
expeditious manner is a key element of the ex ante bargain struck between
creditor and debtor, a bargain that allows the debtor to obtain a loan at a
very attractive interest rate, at least compared with other forms of debt such
as personal loans.
Id.
50 Taken to its extreme, this argument supports prompt, strict foreclosure with no
right of redemption as the most efficient system. See, e.g., James Geoffrey Durham, In De-
fense of Strict Foreclosure: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Mortgage Foreclosure, 36 S.C. L. REv.
461, 462 (1985) (concluding that "strict foreclosure .. . is the most efficient method of
foreclosure, and is equitable and fair in almost every situation").
51 See, e.g., THOMAS H.JACKSON, THE LoCIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRupircy LAW 19, 194-95
(1986).
52 See id.
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that involve only a debtor and a mortgage holder; therefore, there is
no common pool problem, and there should be no bankruptcy case. 53
Permitting a SARE debtor to file for bankruptcy confers no benefits
on a pool of other claimants, there being none, they argue, and it only
imposes unjustified costs and delays on mortgage holders, resulting in
higher interest rates, fewer mortgage loan approvals, 54 and the "with-
holding from the marketplace property capable of producing
value."55 "The time spent in the Bankruptcy Court is wasteful and
without any public benefit."56 Therefore, proponents of this argu-
ment support amending the Bankruptcy Code to bar SARE cases from
reorganizing under Chapter 11.57
Contrary to the claim that the common pool problem is the sole
or primary basis for evaluating the desirability of allowing SARE debt-
ors access to Chapter 11, three principal arguments, developed below,
powerfully favor giving access to Chapter 11 so that SARE debtors
have an opportunity to reorganize. First, Chapter 11 smoothes out
market inefficiencies, particularly during massive real estate down-
turns. Second, federal public policy supports giving property owners a
chance to save their investments. Third, macroeconomic and social
policies favor reorganization of SARE debtors.
First, during broad-based financial crises, allowing debtors to
restructure debts in Chapter 11 smoothes, economic turbulence and
precludes the downward spiral in real estate prices that can result
when mortgage holders simultaneously dump massive amounts of
foreclosed properties on the market. In addition, Chapter 11 func-
tions in SARE cases to smooth out market inefficiencies caused by
53 See, e.g., Daniel C. Draper, Stays of Mortgage Foreclosure-A Proposal for Reform, 93
BANKING LJ. 133, 135-36 (1976). Draper writes:
Although, in many cases, the insolvent debtor can adjust its financial situa-
tion and eventually satisfy creditors, in our experience that is rarely, if ever,
the case for a single-project real estate corporation. The presumption that
"time will heal" is simply not valid where the debtor has virtually nothing to
reorganize except a single mortgaged project .... Stays against secured
creditors of single-project corporations rarely increase the probability of re-
organization and consequently cannot further any policy aimed at enhanc-
ing all opportunities for success by the debtor.
Id.; Commercial and Public Sector Issues in Bankruptcy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. &
Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 250 (1992) (statement of
Michael F. Brown) ("When financial problems arise.., virtually the only creditor is the
mortgage holder. Generally there is little or no trade debt or other associated debt.").
54 See Commercial and Credit Hearing, supra note 27, at 183 (1991) (statement ofJames
W. Nelson) ("The results of lenders' potential losses from single-asset foreclosure delays
are higher mortgage interest rates to compensate for loss, [and) a disincentive for institu-
tional lenders to continue to invest in commercial mortgages ... ").
55 Draper, supra note 53, at 138.
56 Id. at 142.
57 See, e.g., 1 NAT'L BANKR. REvIEw COMM'N , BANltuvrcY. THE NEXT Twrrv YEaRS
661 n.1678 (1997) (citing authorities), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/
reporttitlepg.html.
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state foreclosure systems. 58 Specifically, some state law foreclosure sys-
tems are flawed because they permit lenders to seize property and
conduct foreclosure sales without sufficient notice, resulting in artifi-
cially depressed prices. 59 Although the Depression is long gone, "the
modem mortgage market is subject to deficiencies that create similar
market declines. ' 60 These evils exist "[n] ot ... only in time of emer-
gency."' 61 Thus, many foreclosures result in nonconsensual sales at be-
low-market price. By contrast, Chapter 11 gives the property owner
the opportunity to sell the property over a reasonable period of time.
When debtors sell properties with their lenders' cooperation, the re-
sulting orderly sales can increase value for the lenders and other cred-
itors. Alternatively, Chapter 11 permits the property owner to
restructure the mortgage through a consensual valuation under a
plan supported by the mortgage holder or through a "market-tested"
valuation in a contested plan confirmation. 62
Several commentators have endorsed these arguments. Based on
his previous writing,63 Judge Bufford testified that real estate reorgani-
zation had its roots in the Depression and that Congress enacted it to
prevent banks from owning most of the real estate in the nation.6 4
58 See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors
Bradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REv. 79, 100 (1992).
59 See Arthur J. Hughes, Reorganization Under the Amended Bankrupty Act, 13 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 112, 114 (1937). Hughes writes:
Market values did not properly approximate the real values of the proper-
ties. The scarcity of purchasers generally enabled a few buyers to acquire
properties at... far below the cost of the properties .... To be forced to
sell in such a market, was certain to result in a complete loss to the debtor
and a substantial loss to the creditors.
Id.; see also Armstrong v. Csurilla, 817 P.2d 1221, 1223 (N.M. 1991) ("When property sub-
ject to a mortgage or other lien is sold in foreclosure proceedings, the buyer is usually the
mortgagee or other lien creditor and the price for which the property is 'bought in' is
sometimes significantly less than the property's fair market value."); cf. BFP v. Resolution
Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 539 (1994) (noting that property sold under the strictures of
foreclosure is simply worth less than fair market value).
60 Robert M. Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative Response to Price Inadequacy in Mort-
gage Foreclosure Sales, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 843, 851-52 & n.48 (1980) (citing Nat'l Bank v.
Equity Investors, 506 P.2d 20, 43-44 (Wash. 1973) (en banc)); see also Arthur E. Wilmarth,
Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, the Federal Response, and the Case for Preserving the Dual
Banking System, 58 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1133, 1244 (1990) ("[During the late 1980s,] bank
failures in Texas have been caused primarily by an excessive concentration of bank assets
in commercial loans related to real estate and energy ventures.").
61 D.J. Farage, Mortgage Deficiency Judgment Acts and Their Constitutionality, 41 DIcK. L.
REV. 67, 67 (1937) ("[E]mergencies do expose to the spotlight certain economic malprac-
tices, which, in more prosperous times, flourish unheeded.").
62 See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n. v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Ltd. P'ship, 526 U.S.
434 (1999).
63 See Samuel L. Bufford, What Is Right About Bankruptcy Law and Wrong About Its Critics,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 829, 836-38 (1994) (arguing that bankruptcy law "prevents secured cred-
itors from collectively starting a downward spiral of foreclosures and bank failures that
could result in the failure of the entire economy").
64 See 1 NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, supra note 57, at 680.
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Former FDIC Chairman William Seidman testified before the House
Banking Committee in 1990 that when bank regulators force quick
sales of real estate owned after foreclosure, property values decline
precipitously.65 Thus, when it considered the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 2001, Congress was aware that orderly liquidations leave society bet-
ter off.
Second, Chapter 11 also implements important federal policies
protecting ownership investments in real estate. Contrary to the asser-
tion that SARE cases are two-party disputes, many cases involve the
interests of numerous owners who have invested in the real estate pro-
ject.66 As a normative matter, Chapter 11 protects general partners or
guarantors who might be liable for foreclosure deficiencies from the
risk of an unfair 67 or inefficient state foreclosure process. As a conse-
quence, partners and guarantors can make efficient decisions ex ante
whether to invest in real estate projects. 68 Moreover, minimizing fore-
closure deficiencies has a beneficial second-order effect. The efficien-
cies of Chapter 11 reduce the tax recapture liability of partners in a
65 See, e.g., Stuart D. Root, Bank Capital, Asset Liquidation, and the Credit Crunch, 1993
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 169, 182-83 (citing Federal Home Loan Bank Board 1988 Deals: Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Banking Fin. & Urban Affairs, 101st Cong. 28 (1990) (testimony of
William Seidman, Chairman, FDIC)) ("Congress... seemingly ignored... estimate[s] that
assets lose up to twenty percent of value when they are taken over by the government for
disposition. A liquidation program involving hundreds of billions of dollars in assets is
thus bound to have an adverse impact on values of assets held by institutions." (footnotes
omitted)).
66 Some cases also involve unsecured creditors, such as vendors, property managers,
and tenants.
67 Although law-and-economics scholarship generally has steered clear of distribu-
tional issues, recently economic analysis in the literature has attacked the propriety of mak-
ing fairness-based assessments. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus
lWefare, 114 HARv. L. REV. 961, 1011 (2001) (criticizing fairness-based assessments on the
ground that they depend "exclusively on the effects of legal rules on individuals' well-
being" and, as a consequence, "can make individuals worse off, that is, reduce social wel-
fare"). In this Article, by "unfair," I refer to a state foreclosure statute that provides insuffi-
cient notice or auction procedures to produce a fair market price. See sources cited supra
note 59 and accompanying text. Some commentators might argue that the state foreclo-
sure system is part of the property owner's bargain when it obtains the mortgage. Others
might reply that the property owner's right to file for Chapter 11 relief was a risk the
mortgage holder took when it made the loan.
68 Congress changed the risk/reward ratio for real estate investments in 1986 when it
withdrew tax incentives to invest in real estate and enacted passive activity loss rules. See
Daniel S. Goldberg, Tax Subsidies: One-Time vs. Periodic: An Economic Analysis of the Tax Policy
Alternatives, 49 TAx L. REv. 305, 340 (1994). But Chapter 11 remains an important part of
the risk/reward ratio by protecting owners from immediate loss of their investments in the
event their business faces a liquidity crisis. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 36, at 357-58
(describing the policies of Chapter 11 as encouraging risk-taking behavior); LoPucki, supra
note 58, at 100 (asserting that Chapter 11 offers "the owners, and more importantly the
creditors, an alternative to putting the debtor's assets on the auction block" when the
debtor faces a liquidity crisis).
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debtor real estate partnership, thus preventing governments from
reaping a windfall due to artificially low foreclosure prices. 69
Third, macroeconomic and social policies also favor reorganiza-
tion of SARE debtors. Granting SARE debtors meaningful access to
Chapter 11 not only makes good economic sense, but it is also good
social policy. Generally, mortgage lenders are the successful bidders
at foreclosure sales.70 Chapter 11 prevents undue concentration of
real estate ownership into the hands of large financial institutions dur-
ing economic downturns by facilitating reorganization and the
debtor's retention of ownership. 71 Moreover, some commentators
contend that Chapter 11 allows the bankruptcy court to consider equi-
table, community, and other factors in ruling on a mortgage holder's
relief from a stay motion.72 For example, a court might consider that
69 Federal and state governments impose taxes on depreciation recapture and capital
gains arising from loan foreclosures whether or not the loan is recourse. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C.
§§ 1231, 1245, 1250 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The concept of a nonrecourse loan in bank-
ruptcy is described by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 86
(1991) (defining nonrecourse loans as "agreements where the creditor's only rights are
against property of the debtor, and not against the debtor personally" (citation omitted)).
Taxpayers who dispose of property subject to nonrecourse debt in excess of basis typically
must pay tax on an amount of gain equal to the excess. See Comm'r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300,
317 (1983). For a thorough description of how real property foreclosures create taxable
gains, see Interhotel Co. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1804 (T.C. 2001). See also Gregory
M. Stein, The Scope of the Borrower's Liability in a Nonrecourse Real Estate Loan, 55 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 1207, 1220 (1998) (discussing the tax benefits to limited partners when their part-
nerships borrow on a nonrecourse basis rather than on a recourse basis).
70 Basil H. Mattingly, The Shift from Power to Process: A Functional Approach to Foreclosure
Law, 80 MARQ. L. REv. 77, 101 (1996) (stating that lenders rely on foreclosure "to control
their collateral, to cut the borrower out of the title picture" because they "generally antici-
pate being the purchaser at foreclosure sales"). "'Typically, lenders are the successful bid-
ders at foreclosure sales. After buying the property the lenders take the property into their
portfolios.... [T]hey [then] hire real estate agents to locate prospective purchasers.'" Id.
at 101 n.104 (quoting Maury B. Poscover, A Commercially Reasonable Sale Under Article 9:
Commercial, Reasonable, and Fair to All Involved, 28 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 235, 246 (1994)).
71 For example, during the 1980s, government regulators seized several savings and
loan associations and forced most of them to simultaneously market and sell the real estate
they owned. As a result, the market was flooded with real estate inventory and prices plum-
meted. See Goldberg, supra note 68, at 341 ("[P]rices declined further and the market
became flooded with available real estate.").
72 See, e.g., Raymond T. Nimmer, Real Estate Creditors and the Automatic Stay: A Study in
Behavioral Economics, 1983 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 281, 281 (1983). Nimmer writes:
A secured creditor who can remove the stay may gain a substantial eco-
nomic benefit. Depending on the relationship between the secured collat-
eral and the debtor's overall estate, denial or delay of foreclosure may be
vital to ultimate completion of a plan for relief .... [Economic and finan-
cial] factors are not the only considerations that courts apply.... The result
is a general balancing of equitable factors ... that is significantly more
complex than the pure economic evaluation often suggested in the
literature.
Id.; see also Karen Gross, Taking Community Interests into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 1031 (1994) (arguing that courts should take community interests into ac-
count in bankruptcy).
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"[m]any foreclosures occur in inner-city neighborhoods occupied by
low-income groups ... fac[ing] unemployment in an economic down-
turn... [and] are thus more likely to default on their mortgage loans
and less able to avoid foreclosure. '73
It appears that these three arguments won out over law-and-eco-
nomics arguments to the contrary. For reasons that were not appar-
ent in congressional debates concerning the 2001 Amendment,
neither Congress nor the mortgage holders embraced arguments to
exclude SARE debtors from Chapter 11.74 Perhaps they were aware
that within the realm of economics (in opposition to the efficiency
arguments identified at the beginning of this subpart), some com-
mentators believe that Chapter 11 reorganization promotes allocative
efficiency as compared with foreclosure under state law. 75 Or perhaps
they accepted the above three arguments in response to the efficiency
and common pool problems. State law foreclosure is more efficient
than Chapter 11 under most market conditions. When real estate
markets are turbulent, however, our experience with the Depression
teaches us that state law foreclosure imperils both borrowers and lend-
ers. Moreover, we should not forget that politicians are responsible
for legislation. Many politicians consider issues of fairness and equity
that generally fall outside the realm of allocative efficiency.76 As iden-
tified above, these concerns could well support a political decision to
allow SARE debtors access to Chapter 11. As discussed below, that is
what the politicians did.
73 Washburn, supra note 60, at 853.
74 Some witnesses made arguments based on efficiency to urge repeal of the $4 mil-
lion cap, but not to support an outright ban on SARE debtors' access to Chapter 11. See
Bankruptcy Amendments of 1997; and Bankruptcy Law Technical Corrections Act of 1997: Hearing
on H.R, 764 and H.P 120 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial &Admin. Law of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 106-09 (1997) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Amendments Hearing]
(statement of Donald R. Ennis) (asserting that repeal of the $4 million cap is necessary "to
permit the efficient operation of the single asset provisions and the fulfillment of their
purpose").
75 Contrary to the argument that allocative efficiency requires strict foreclosure with-
out redemption, economic data demonstrate that mortgagor protection laws "may indeed
promote economic efficiency." Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protec-
tion Laws, 77 VA. L. REv. 489, 491 (1991). According to Schill, "[V]iewed from an ex ante
perspective, mortgagor protections may promote, rather than impede, economic efficiency
by functioning as a form of insurance against the adverse effects of default and foreclo-
sure." Id. at 538. This Article does not attempt to resolve which commentators are correct,
whether state law foreclosure systems are preferable to Chapter 11, or which group has the
burden of proof in evaluating comparative economic efficiencies. Rather, it is based on
the assumption that Congress has adopted Chapter 11 as a federal alternative to state law
foreclosure.
76 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 67, at 1011 (arguing that economic analysis should
give no weight to notions of fairness).
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D. The Politics
Those interest groups that pushed for special treatment of SARE
debtors could have instead called for their exclusion. Since argu-
ments for the complete exclusion of two-party disputes were made at
the time of both the 1994 and 2001 amendments, why did the lending
industry not push for an outright exclusion of SARE cases from bank-
ruptcy? Perhaps their lobbyists counseled against trying to overturn a
federal policy that is over sixty years old. Alternatively, it is possible
that mortgage holders wanted their borrowers, in some cases, to have
access to Chapter 11.
In cases in which title to the property is clouded or the property
contains toxic waste, for example, mortgage holders prefer to use the
bankruptcy court to their own advantage. 77 Chapter 11 fully con-
strains the property owner's activities, and the property may be cle-
aned while the mortgage holder avoids any liability arising out of
ownership resulting from foreclosure. By permitting property owners
to reorganize under Chapter 11, mortgage holders get the best of
both worlds.
However, the lenders' attraction to Chapter 11 is narrow: They
want all of the benefits of bankruptcy and also control over the pro-
cess. For example, they do not want the debtor to be able to restruc-
ture secured debt without the lender's consent. Moreover, lenders
are not content to receive these benefits in small SARE cases; they
want them in all SARE cases.78 Thus, they influenced the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission to make a recommendation to Con-
77 Lenders may realize another subtle benefit of Chapter 11. Mortgage holders who
do not want to foreclose on defaulted real properties may use the automatic stay of borrow-
ers' Chapter 11 filings to accomplish that objective, even if the mortgage holders' govern-
ment regulators would prefer immediate foreclosure. During a borrower's Chapter 11
case, the automatic stay legally prevents foreclosure unless the lender obtains relief from
the stay. Lenders who do not want real estate assets on their books can fail to seek relief
from the automatic stay or delay the process. See Sutherland, supra note 19, at 217 ("The
mortgagee has ordinarily used every resource to encourage the debtor to keep up his inter-
est and taxes, and comes to foreclosure only when the case is hopeless. The great lending
institutions are reluctant to load themselves with foreclosed real estate . . ").
78 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Amendments Hearing, supra note 74, at 118, 121-22 (statement of
Jill M. Sturtevant, Assistant General Counsel, Bank of America) ("[The American Bankers
Association] strongly supports the... provision ... strik[ing] the $4 million debt cap...
contained in the definition [of] 'single asset real estate.'" (emphasis omitted)); Oversight of
the National Bankruptcy Review Commission Report: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Over-
sight & the Courts of the S. Comm. on theJudiciarj, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement ofJohn A.
Gose) [hereinafter Gose Testimony] ("No rational correlation exists between the size of a
single asset real estate bankruptcy and the complexity of that transaction. A cap, which
presently exists in the Bankruptcy Code, is purely arbitrary."), at 1997 WL 659242.
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gress to amend the law,79 and they financed lobbyists to shepherd that
amendment into law.8 0
It is not surprising, therefore, that in passing the 2001 Amend-
ment, Congress nominally retained access to Chapter 11 for SARE
debtors while sharply reducing the meaningfulness of that access.
The result is a proposed law that permits debtors access to Chapter 11,
but under such tight time restrictions that, after ninety days, the
debtor's functional ability to remain in Chapter 11 usually will be at
the complete discretion of the mortgage holder. Moreover, unlike
current law, the restrictive procedures of the 2001 Amendment would
apply to single asset real property projects of all sizes without regard to
the dollar amount of the mortgage. With this background, we are
prepared to examine closely the 2001 Amendment as a prelude to
determining whether Congress made the right choice in eliminating
the cap.
II
THE 2001 AMENDMENT EXPLODES THE CAP
A. The Rationale for Congressional Action
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 proposes to abolish the $4
million cap in the definition of SARE based on arguments made at
congressional hearings that a one-size reorganization procedure could
fit all SARE bankruptcy cases.81 It is the author's experience that lob-
79 At the instigation of the author, a majority of the bankruptcy commissioners also
supported an alternative recommendation that would have raised the SARE cap but not
eliminated it. See 1 NAT'L BANKR. REVtEW Comm., supra note 57, at 684.
80 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 (Part ff): Hearing on H.R. 833 Before the Sub-
comm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciay, 106th Cong. 5-14
(1999) (statement of George J. Wallace, on behalf of the Consumer Bankruptcy Reform
Coalition); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998 Part I: Hearing on H.R. 3150 Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial & Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 25-28, 38-40
(1998) (statement of Lloyd N. Cutler, on behalf of the Bankruptcy Issues Council); Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1998; Responsible Borrower Protection Act; and Consumer Lenders and Borrow-
ers Bankruptcy Accountability Act of 1998 Part ff. Hearing on H.R. 3150, H.R. 2500, and H.R.
3146 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
105th Cong. 56-63 (1998) (statement of George J. Wallace, on behalf of the American
Financial Services Association).
81 See sources cited supra note 78 and accompanying text. One congressman charac-
terized the repeal of the $4 million cap as necessary to cure an "injustice" stemming "from
a last-minute decision that was made in the 103rd Congress, which placed an arbitrary $4
million ceiling on the single asset provisions of the bankruptcy reform bill. The effect has
been to render investors helpless in foreclosure on single assets valued at over $4 million."
See 145 CONG. REc. H2713 (daily ed. May 5, 1999) (statement of Rep. Knollenberg). Inex-
plicably, in the pending Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, Congress adopted exactly the
opposite rationale in expanding the debt threshold from $2 million to $3 million in the
definition of small business debtors for the purpose of segregating small businesses from
larger businesses. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, H.R. 333, 107th Cong. § 432(a)
(2001) (proposing to amend the definition of "small business debtor" in § 101 (51) (D) of
the Bankruptcy Code to cover businesses that have "aggregate noncontingent, liquidated
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byists for lenders convinced Congress that a real estate case is a real
estate case is a real estate case, whether it is an apartment house or the
Waldorf Astoria Hotel.8 2 Some witnesses told Congress that it should
repeal the $4 million cap because large properties have the same
maintenance, tax, and recapitalization problems as small properties.83
They also stated that repeal of the $4 million cap was necessary "to
permit the efficient operation of the single asset provisions and the
fulfillment of their purpose."84 Other witnesses and commentators
took the position that some form of a cap was appropriate, but had no
hard data to 9upport their claims.8 5 Although a few witnesses sug-
gested banning SARE cases from Chapter 11 altogether, others said
Chapter 11 played an important role in SARE cases.
Some witnesses unsuccessfully argued in support of retaining the
$4 million cap and treating large SARE debtors the same as other
Chapter 11 debtors.8 6 They argued that separate treatment of all
SARE debtors from other debtors would induce lenders to force bor-
rowers to incur transaction costs to form new single asset entities in
order to finance each property, even if the same real party in interest
owned the properties. Thus, if a manufacturer seeks financing for
construction of a $50 million plant, a rational lender will require the
manufacturer to form a single asset company to hold title to the real
estate and become the borrower. The lender may force the manufac-
turer to guarantee the debt. As a result, the manufacturer will not
avoid liability on the loan, and will incur the transaction costs of form-
ing the single asset company and maintaining separate tax, account-
ing, and legal records. Moreover, in the event of insolvency of several
secured and unsecured debts ... in an amount not more than $3,000,000"), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov; Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420, 107th Cong. § 432(a)
(2001) (same), available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
82 See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 354 F. Supp. 717 (E.D. Pa. 1972). After the 2001
Amendment, if the ground leased was real property held by a SARE debtor, 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(d) (3) would apply.
83 See sources cited supra note 78.
84 Bankruptcy Amendments Hearing, supra note 74, at 107 (statement of Donald R.
Ennis).
85 See, e.g., id. at 46 (statement of Kenneth N. Klee, Chairman, Committee on Legisla-
tion, National Bankruptcy Conference) ("I would have to think a $10 million limit would
bring in the lion's share of the projects . . . ."); Lawrence Ponoroff, The Dubious Role of
Precedent in the Quest for First Principles in the Reform of the Bankruptcy Code: Some Lessons from
the Civil Law and Realist Traditions, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 195 (2000) ("Wisely, until now,
the definition of 'single asset real estate' has been limited to debtors with below a certain
maximum level of secured debt .. "). After the congressional hearings, Professors War-
ren and Westbrook analyzed hard data and concluded that the $4 million cap already
covers 72% of the SARE cases and raising the cap to $15 million would capture 94% of the
cases. See Elizabeth Warren &Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of Businesses
in Bankruptcy, 73 Ami. BANKR. L.J. 499, 542-43 (1999).
86 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Amendments Hearing, supra note 74, at 37, 46 (statement and
testimony of Kenneth N. Klee, Chairman, Committee on Legislation, National Bankruptcy
Conference).
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related projects, instead of the manufacturer filing for bankruptcy for
one company that owns several properties, the manufacturer will file a
separate bankruptcy petition for each company that holds a troubled
project, thereby paying multiple filing fees and incurring the costs of
multiple bankruptcy administrations.87
In this light, it is reasonable to question why Congress abandoned
the line it drew in 1994. Was the change occasioned by lobbying pres-
sure from secured lenders, or did circumstances change after 1994?
Was Congress wrong in enacting the cap in the first place in 1994?
Certainly the shared experience that led Congress to adopt the $4
million cap in 1994 suggested that the group of larger SARE cases had
more complex debt structures, greater capacity to service Chapter 11
administrative expenses, and a greater likelihood of confirming a
plan.8 8 That is why Congress enacted special rules only for smaller
SARE debtors. Anecdotal testimony led Congress to believe that
smaller debtors, for the most part, had simple debt structures, little
capacity to service Chapter 11 administrative expenses, and no reason-
able likelihood of confirming a plan. For the small SARE debtors, it
made sense for Congress to pretermit the Chapter 11 process.
The same was not true, however, for larger SARE debtors in 1994,
and it remains untrue in 2002. If there is a reasonable likelihood that,
as a group, large SARE debtors will be able to confirm Chapter 11
plans, what rationale justifies subjecting these debtors to the strictures
of § 362 (d) (3) of the Bankruptcy Code? Indeed, if the data show that
most large SARE cases have a reasonable possibility of confirming a
Chapter 11 plan, it makes more sense for Congress to raise the $4
million cap to a specific dollar sum than to abandon it altogether.
Perhaps Congress believed that if the cap functioned well for small
SARE debtors, it should extend it to all SARE debtors.
87 This strategic behavior certainly is one downside of the pending Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 2001, which allows lenders to opt out of the regular Chapter 11 rules by requir-
ing borrowers to compartmentalize real property assets. Another theoretical by-product of
the proposed Act is that it should reduce monitoring by unsecured creditors. Unsecured
creditors will not likely pay attention to SARE cases if secured lenders will dominate and
quickly foreclose or receive assets as interest payments. In the author's experience, how-
ever, unsecured creditors seldom monitored SARE cases even before the Act was proposed,
because they had little at stake individually.
88 See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies
in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a "Race to the Bottom", 54 VAND. L. REv. 231,
256 (2001) (showing an extremely high confirmation rate for large public companies from
1989 until 1997); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reor-
ganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CoRNELL L. REV. 597, 600 (1993) (reporting a
96% confirmation rate for large, public companies).
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B. Predicted Effects of Blowing Up the Cap
Whether or not Congress justifiably proposed to explode the $4
million cap, if the proposal becomes law, parties in SARE cases will
have to adapt to those changes. The new reality for large SARE debt-
ors will be that they will be subject to lenders' threats to bring, and
actually file, motions for relief from the automatic stay under
§ 362 (d) (3). How will this change in leverage affect the way Chapter
11 functions for large SARE debtors? Certainly it will be unreasonable
for many large SARE debtors to file a plan within ninety days after the
order for relief. To be sure, the court can extend this time for
"cause,"89 but why should the large SARE debtor have to bear the cost,
burden, and uncertainty of bringing such a motion? The cost of
bringing a motion is inevitable and not recoupable. The burden of
proving the "cause" for an extension is on the large SARE debtor,
unlike all the other large debtors who have a minimum 120-day exclu-
sivity period within which to file a plan and do not face automatic
foreclosure if they fail to file within that period. The uncertainty
about whether the judge will grant the extension motion is obvious.
Many judges have displayed open hostility toward SARE debtors.90
Of course, the debtor has the theoretical option of commencing
payments to the mortgage holder. But many SARE debtors are illiq-
uid.91 The SARE debtor might be cash poor because the debtor has
not completed the real estate project, because the debtor needs
money for repairs, maintenance, or renovation, or because a down
market has created large vacancy rates. Moreover, in most SARE
cases, the mortgage holder has a lien on the rents. 92 Under current
89 See sources cited supra note 9.
90 Generally, judicial hostility is evident when a judge characterizes the SARE debtor
as having filed its bankruptcy petition "in bad faith." See, e.g., Pac. First Bank ex rel. R.T.
Capital Corp. v. Boulders on the River, Inc. (In re Boulders on the River, Inc.), 164 B.R. 99,
103 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) ("Bad faith exists if there is no realistic possibility of reorganiza-
tion and the debtor seeks merely to delay or frustrate efforts of secured creditors.");
United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest
Assocs., Ltd.), 808 F.2d 363, 384 (5th Cir. 1987) ("To the extent that the debtor in bank-
ruptcy can prevent the secured creditor from enforcing its rights against collateral while
the debtor benefits from the creditor's money, the debtor and his unsecured creditors
receive a windfall at the expense of the secured creditor."), aftd, 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
Courts often dismiss debtors' Chapter 11 petitions when they are filed in "bad faith." See,
e.g., Albany Partners, Ltd. v. Westbrook (In re Albany Partners, Ltd.), 749 F.2d 670, 676
(11 th Cir. 1984) (affirming a lower court's annulment of a stay); Singer Furniture Acquisi-
tion Corp. v. SSMC Inc. N.V., 254 B.R. 46, 60 (M.D. Fla. 2000); see also In re Pac. Rim Invs.,
LLP, 243 B.R. 768, 773 (D. Colo. 2000) (rejecting "the argument that the ability to reor-
ganize precludes dismissal for bad faith.").
91 See LoPucki, supra note 58, at 100; sources cited supra note 36.
92 In some SARE cases, the mortgage holder has an "absolute assignment" of the rents
whereby the mortgage holder owns the rents until the mortgage is paid. See, e.g., Great W.
Life Assurance Co. v. Rothman (In reVentura-Louise Props.), 490 F.2d 1141, 1143-44 (9th
Cir. 1974) ("[A] n agreement can provide for an absolute assignment of rents upon default.
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law, mortgage holders have persuaded some courts that rents are ad-
ditional collateral that the law must protect separately, and that they
are unavailable to protect a mortgage holder's lien on a real property
project.93 One beneficial provision of the proposed Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 2001 makes rents available to satisfy the debtor's payment
obligation under § 362(d) (3) of the Bankruptcy Code.94 But in many
cases, the net rents will be insufficient to service the debtor's payment
'It has been held that such a provision, rather than pledging the rents as additional secur-
ity, operates to transfer to the mortgagee, the mortgagor's right to the rentals upon the
happening of a specified condition.'" (quoting Kinnison v. Guar. Liquidating Corp., 115
P.2d 450, 453 (Cal. 1941)). Although beyond the scope of this Article, discussion of rents
has created a large body of literature. Not less than sixty-four law review articles contain
the word "rents" in their tides. Of these, no fewer than seventeen also mention In re Ven-
tura-Louise. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, Rents in Bankruptcy, 46 S.C. L. REv. 1075, 1104
(1995) (discussing In re Ventura-Louise for the proposition that judges routinely authorize
forfeitures upon default and allow secured parties to collect rent); Julia Patterson For-
rester, A Uniform and More Rational Approach to Rents as Security for the Mortgage Loan, 46
RUTGERs L. REv. 349, 379-82 (1993) (discussing the trend in the treatment of absolute
assignment of rents cases); Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., When Should Bankruptcy Courts Recognize
Lenders' Rents Interests?, 23 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 833, 841-45 (1990) (discussing the condi-
tional present assignment theory as adopted in In re Ventura-Louise); John C. Siemers, The
Mortgagee's Lien Against Rents, 25 TEX. TECH L. REv. 873, 892 n.70 (1994) (acknowledging In
re Ventura-Louise in a footnote); Joanne N. Davies, Note, FNIVIA v. Bugna: California Assign-
ment of Rents Provision and the Impact of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
1453, 1466 (1998) (discussing the "contradictory and confusing" case law surrounding the
protection of a lender's security interest in postpetition rents); Sandra Elzerman, Com-
ment, Interests in Collaterally Assigned Rents and Profits Under the Bankruptcy Code, 22 Hous. L.
REv. 1251, 1265 n.101 (1985) (acknowledging In re Ventura-Louise in a footnote).
93 See, e.g., In re 499 W. Warren St. Assocs., Ltd. P'ship, 142 B.L 53, 56 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that "a secured creditor holding both a mortgage securing a debt
on a parcel of real property, and a perfected security interest in rents derived therefrom,
holds two distinct interests," and discussing cases laying out the contours of this approach);
see also John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Madera Farms P'ship (In re Madera Farms
P'ship), 66 B.L 100, 103 (Ba.P. 9th Cir. 1986) ("It is clear that the rents are additional
collateral."); In re Landing Assocs., Ltd., 122 B.R. 288, 296 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (con-
sidering the value of the mortgage securing a debt on a parcel of land as separate from the
security interest in the rents derived from it); Mortgage Guarantee Co. v. Sampsell, 124
P.2d 353, 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942) ("There can be no question but that the assignment of
rentals in the deed of trust constituted additional primary security with the real property
described in the deed of trust and the personal property described in the chattel mort-
gage." (citation omitted)).
94 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, H.R. 333, 107th Cong., § 444(2) (2001); Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420, 107th Cong., § 444(2) (2001). Section 444(2) would
amend 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (3) (B) to preclude relief from the stay under § 362(d) (3) if-
(B) the debtor has commenced monthly payments that-
(i) may, in the debtor's sole discretion, notwithstanding section
363(c) (2), be made from rents or other income generated before or
after the commencement of the case by or from the property to each
creditor whose claim is secured by such real estate (other than a claim
secured by a judgment lien or by an unmatured statutory lien); and
(ii) are in an amount equal to interest at the then applicable
nondefault contract rate of interest on the value of the creditor's inter-
est in the real estate; ....
H.R_ 333, § 444(2); S. 420, § 444(2).
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obligation in full. Thus, in many SARE cases, the debtor's option to
commence making payments will be unrealistic.
If the debtor cannot file a confirmable plan within the fast track
of § 362(d) (3), commence making payments to the mortgage holder,
or persuade the court to grant an extension of time, then the mort-
gage holder is effectively in complete control of the Chapter 11 pro-
cess. If the property has a feature, for example environmental waste,
such that the mortgage holder might benefit by leaving the property
in Chapter 11, the mortgage holder can grant an extension of time or
fail to foreclose following relief from the stay. Alternatively, if the bor-
rower faces tax problems in the event of foreclosure, the lender can
threaten foreclosure to extract a contribution of new equity into the
project to reinstate the loan and restore it to a performing asset on
the lender's books. On the other hand, if the property has potential
upside and the mortgage holder desires to capture this upside for its
own benefit, then the mortgage holder gets relief from the automatic
stay and the right to foreclose on the property. In essence, the Chap-
ter 11 case is over. Although this might be good news for the mort-
gage holder, it is bad news for the property owner who loses the
opportunity to reorganize.
III
DATA FROM SARE CHAPTER 11 CASES
A. Methodology
Talk is cheap. It is easy to criticize Congress for failing to develop
data concerning the operation of SARE cases before it proposed sig-
nificant changes, but it is much harder to develop those data than to
criticize Congress for failing to do so. This is especially true for schol-
ars and others who work with limited access to the underlying data
and limited means to fund the needed research. Given the impor-
tance of bankruptcy law and the constitutional requirement that any
federal bankruptcy law be uniform, 95 it is astounding that Congress
has not developed better bankruptcy data on which to base its legisla-
tive decisions. For example, there is no national database of bank-
ruptcy court records; bankruptcy courts compile and store their
records locally. Furthermore, the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts does not collect separately-recorded data on SARE cases. This
means that the resources necessary to draw a national sample of SARE
cases would be beyond the reach of a single researcher.
Faced with the prospect of cursing the darkness or lighting a very
small candle, however, I decided to study what I could. I drew two
samples of data: The first was a national sample of all reported SARE
95 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 4.
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decisions augmented by data on unreported SARE cases sent to me by
lawyers in response to a questionnaire. The second extracted SARE
data from the files of all Chapter 11 cases administered by a single
bankruptcy judge in Los Angeles. I refer to the first sample as the
"National" data set and the second sample as the "L.A." data set. I also
combined the National and L.A. data sets into a "Combined" data set.
I began this research by collecting every published bankruptcy
court opinion dealing with a SARE Chapter 11 case under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, despite the shortcomings of such a database. Published
opinions may be grist for law school classes, but they are not random
samples of all the cases decided. Indeed, the fact that an opinion is
published is a fair indication that something is aberrational in the
case. This defect afflicts any study of published opinions, although in
the bankruptcy area it is ameliorated by the fact that trial courts-not
just appellate courts-publish their decisions. That difference makes
a database drawn from bankruptcy court opinions somewhat closer to
a representative sample and the underlying reality, although the cases
in which there was a sufficient dispute to prompt a published opinion
are obviously somewhat different from a perfect cross-section of all the
underlying cases. The cases that result in a written opinion may in-
volve more money, more contentious creditors, or more aggressive
lawyers. Despite these limitations, however, a database consisting of
all published SARE cases, dominated by cases from the bankruptcy
trial courts themselves, can shed some light on the operation of real
estate Chapter 11 cases.
Therefore, in order to test the reasonableness of abolishing the
$4 million cap, I studied every reported SARE Chapter 11 case from
October 1, 1979 through December 31, 1997 to extract the following
data, among others:96
96 Because I am not recommending a specific debt limit for Congress to adopt, I did
not develop a specific dollar value or adjust debts and property values for the data set to
constant dollars for a specific base year. My hypothesis is that adjusting the data over time
is an appropriate fine-tuning of my methodology, but unnecessary to support the trends
identified in this Article. To make certain, however, that the data are not distorted by
inflationary differences, the debts and property values were recomputed using an inflation
adjustment based on the year of the bankruptcy filing. It is possible, of course, that the
mortgage debt or property valuation was made a year or two after the filing, but this adjust-
ment helps to eliminate most of the inflationary effects. Of the forty-five cases in the Na-
tional data set, only thirty-two have information on the year in which the Chapter 11
petition was filed. It appears, however, that most of the remaining thirteen cases were filed
between 1987 and 1993. I used 1990 as a proxy-valuation year for these data and used
actual filing years for the thirty-two cases in which I had filing data. I adjusted the values
using the Consumer Price Index, and re-ran the regression. The resulting Nagelkerke R2
(see infra note 154) is very similar (.44) compared with the pre-adjustment Negelkerke RF
(.42): the coefficients are almost identical, and the significance levels improve. The p-value
for property value is .0043 (compared with <.01) and for the value-to-loan ratio is .0184. In
sum, inflation does not appear to have a measurable effect on the statistical analysis.
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" type of property;
" valuation range of the property;
" whether there was an out-of-court settlement, cram down, or con-
sensual plan;
" whether maintenance and taxes were current pre-workout or
prepetition;
" the terms of the senior and any junior indebtedness pre- and post-
restructuring or plan confirmation; and
o any treatment of the old equity under the plan.
In total, the database contains sixteen categories of information per-
taining to various factual aspects of the cases.
To gather some information about a cross-section of SARE cases
that did not result in a published opinion, I developed and circulated
a questionnaire to 302 bankruptcy lawyers. Of the bankruptcy special-
ists selected, I chose ninety based on my own experience and 212
from a bar association's membership list.9 7 The questionnaire asked
each lawyer to provide the same kinds of information on all SARE
cases in which they participated since October 1, 1979.98 As described
below, this permitted expansion of the initial thirty usable cases 99 in
the database by another fifteen cases. 10 0
Many of the reported decisions and a few of the questionnaires
did not contain complete data in every category. To fill gaps in the
data, I asked attorneys involved in the cases to provide additional in-
formation.10 1 The database included 152 cases with sufficiently com-
plete information for an extended analysis. Those 152 cases included
120 bankruptcy court decisions, thirteen appellate court decisions,
and nineteen cases generated from the questionnaires, representing
97 Specifically, I sent eighty-nine letters on February 5, 1998, fifty-three letters on
April 9, 1998, sixty-four letters on April 16, 1998, and ninety-five letters on April 28, 1998 to
bankruptcy specialists known to me and to members of the ABA Business Bankruptcy Com-
mittee. I also sent one specialist the questionnaire via e-mail. In response, I received ques-
tionnaires describing sixteen SARE cases. The response rate is low probably due to the
time and expense required of respondents to assemble the requested information.
98 I extracted the data from the case law and questionnaires and entered it into a
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. I have reproduced a sample questionnaire infra in Appendix
B.
99 I define the term "usable case" to mean a case with sufficiently complete informa-
tion for an extended statistical analysis.
100 It is possible that the low response rate producing these fifteen cases could lead to
sample bias. Confirmation rates for these cases are significantly higher than the reported
decisions. This disparity may reflect a judicial bias to write and publish opinions denying
confirmation, or it may reflect a bias on the part of attorneys in submitting data on con-
firmed cases in response to my questionnaire. Additional research would be necessary to
resolve these issues.
101 I used printed versions of each published case listed in the database. It was neces-
sary to read the case, highlight the pertinent information, and then transfer it to the
database. I have retained for the file these marked-up versions that contained data in-
cluded in the study.
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unpublished cases. Many of the 152 entries in the database, however,
involved the same SARE reorganization case due to multiple-reported
decisions on the same property by the bankruptcy and appellate
courts. I deleted duplicate entries from the database, but augmented
individual entries on particular SARE projects with data derived from
related reports.'0 2 The resulting National data set comprised forty-
five usable cases. Because of the relatively small number of observa-
tions in the data set and the lack of randomness in the sample selec-
tion, I developed another database to test the robustness of my
findings.
While I was collecting my initial database on SARE cases, a
unique opportunity to examine detailed court records came my way.
When Judge Lisa Hill Fenning decided to leave the bench in February
2000, she gave me nine boxes of court documents she had collected
on her cases in the Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia. Judge Fenning had compiled files on each business bank-
ruptcy case over which she had presided from 1987 through 1995
during her tenure on the bench. She collected case files on all kinds
of Chapter 11 cases she had heard, not only on the handful for which
she wrote published opinions.
A few words about her cases are in order. First, Chapter 11 case
assignment in the Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia is random; SARE cases were only remotely assigned to a particular
judge. Thus, all judges presumably had an equal likelihood of hear-
ing a SARE case. Although it is one of ninety-four judicial districts
around the country and its territories, through the mid-1990s the Cen-
tral District of California was the largest in terms of number of Chap-
ter 11 business bankruptcy cases filed.'0 3 From 1987 through 1995,
102 None of the cases included in the database involved repeat filings in which the
same debtor or project was in Chapter 11 on more than one occasion. Some commenta-
tors view continuation of the business or the lack of a repeat filing as an essential measure
of success. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chap-
ter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code? (pt. 1), 57 AM. BANaL- LJ. 99, 106-08 (1983) (defining the
survival of a business as a measure of success). For purposes of this Article, however, I
measured the initial confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan without regard to repeat filings.
This is the goal Congress has established for Chapter 11 cases. The Bankruptcy Code per-
mits a court to confirm a Chapter 11 plan based on a reasonable likelihood, rather than
certainty or a strong probability, that confirmation will not precede liquidation or further
financial reorganization of the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (11) (2000).
103 See, e.g, THE 1993 BANKRUPTcu YEARBOOK & ALmANAC 14-16 (Christopher M. Mc-
Hugh ed., 3d ed. 1993) (showing that Chapter 11 business case filings in the Bankruptcy
Court for the Central District of California constituted about 9% of all Chapter 11 business
cases filed nationally). Based on data compiled by the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts, during 1987-1995, the Central District of California was the venue for 12,088
Chapter 11 business bankruptcy cases, representing 8.18% of the 147,849 business bank-
ruptcy Chapter 11 cases filed nationwide during those years. The next largest district was
the Southern District of New York, which hosted 7,471 or 5.05% of the business bank-
ruptcy Chapter 11 cases. See ADMIN. SERV. OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1995 JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF
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12,088 Chapter 11 business cases were filed in the Bankruptcy Court
for the Central District of California, constituting over 8% of all busi-
ness bankruptcy cases filed nationally.10 4 Although it is not possible to
say whether Judge Fenning's cases were a representative cross-section
of cases filed across the country, her cases represent a sample of one
of the most active bankruptcy courts in the country. Furthermore,
even though these cases reflect the administration of only one judge
in only one district, they provided a cross-check against which I tested
my findings from my initial broader-based data set.
I extracted every SARE Chapter 11 case from Judge Fenning's
boxes. In some instances, the case file documents were incomplete or
merely face-page filings with no supporting data; however, there were
far more records of SARE cases than appeared in reported opinions.
Fortunately, many of the SARE cases had detailed records. The docu-
ments typically included bankruptcy petitions, schedules, and state-
ments of financial affairs. If the case resulted in a confirmed plan, I
also extracted data from that document.
I extracted only those SARE cases with sufficient information to
identify and research the matter further. Where the data were incom-
plete, in order to expand the usefulness of these data, I reviewed each
complete case file and recorded additional information pertinent to
the study. I extracted the values in my L.A. database from the debtor's
bankruptcy petition, schedules, and statement of financial affairs, all
of which were filed under penalty of perjury. If the debtor amended
the schedules, I used the amended values. When there was an undis-
puted and a better source of information in the case file than the data
provided in the schedules, I included that source in the L.A. database.
Examples of better sources included undisputed appraisals of real
property value, undisputed declarations of creditors detailing indebt-
edness and arrearages, Internal Revenue Service statements of tax ar-
rearages, and court findings.
THE UNITED STATES CouRTs-1995 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 268 tbl.F-2 (1995); ADMIN.
SERV. OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, at AI-186
tbl.F-2 (1994); ADMIN. SERV. OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1993 JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT-ANNuAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, at AI-190 tbl.F-2 (1993); ADMIN. SERV.
OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECToR-ATIVITIES OF THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE OFFICE: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 316 tbl.F-2 (1992); AD-
MIN. SERV. OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DiREcroR-AcrivrTES OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 296 tbl.F-2
(1991); ADMIN. SERV. OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 240 tbl.F-2 (1990); ADMIN. SERV. OF THE
U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 362 tbl.F-2 (1989); ADMIN. SERV. OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL RE-
PORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 364
tbl.F-2 (1988); ADMIN. SERV. OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 351 tbl.F-2 (1987).
104 See sources cited supra note 103.
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The L.A. database yielded eighty-three single asset bankruptcy
cases that contained twenty-three submitted plans of reorganization.
Of the twenty-three submitted plans, the bankruptcy court confirmed
thirteen of them. The two databases-one comprising national re-
ported decisions and lawyer reports and a second comprising the Los
Angeles cases-offer two approaches to understanding SARE cases. I
also combined the databases to conduct additional analysis, but fo-
cused primarily on the National data set to avoid allegations that in-
cluding the L.A. data set in the sample would result in improper
distortion. 10 5 Both the National and L.A. data sets include cases filed
after the effective date of the 1994 amendments. Although it is possi-
ble that the 1994 amendments caused a higher percentage of small
cases to fail to confirm plans, I did not segregate the data to test this
hypothesis. I chose to use the National data set to test my hypotheses
initially and the L.A. and Combined data sets to test the robustness of
my findings.
B. The Findings
The overriding question concerning SARE cases is whether the
game is worth the candle; does the debtor's opportunity to reorganize
bear fruit or does it simply impose cost and delay on the mortgage
holder as some law-and-economics theorists suggest? The answer to
this question necessarily sets the parameters for every other discussion
about the SARE process.
To answer this question, I analyzed the data to determine the fre-
quency with which SARE debtors confirmed Chapter 11 plans. 10 6 Out
of the forty-five cases in the National database, seventeen debtors
(38%) confirmed plans. Some plans resulted in restructuring the se-
cured debt while the debtor retained ownership of the property.
Other plans resulted in the sale of the property. Still others were hy-
brid plans; the debtor retained the property for a specified time while
committing to sell it or permit foreclosure if it did not repay the mort-
gage holder's restructured debt within that time.
When Congress enacted Chapter 11, it noted that "[t]he purpose
of [a] reorganization ... case is to formulate and have confirmed a
plan of reorganization.., for the debtor." 0 7 Although confirmation
105 The author knows of no reason why Judge Fenning would treat SARE cases in Los
Angeles any differently than would bankruptcy judges in other judicial districts.
106 Previous studies have analyzed the success that real property debtors had in liqui-
dating properties and concluded that only one in seven (about 14%) were successful. See
LoPucki, supra note 102, at 109 & nn.47-49; see alsojerome R. Kerkman, The Debtor in Full
ControL" A Case for Adoption of the Trustee System, 70 MARQ. L. REv. 159, 167 (1987) (finding
that "in Kansas City and Milvaukee ... 74% and 76%, respectively, of the operating busi-
nesses entering Chapter 11 proceedings were destined to fail" (footnotes omitted)).
107 H.IR REP. No. 95-595, at 221 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6180.
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of a SARE plan is not a foolproof surrogate for positive social value,108
it is the recognized hallmark of a successful Chapter 11 case,109 even if
some commentators regard it as underinclusive" or overinclusive"
108 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 584
(1998) ("Chapter 11 cannot be judged merely by counting the number of firms that reor-
ganize successfully.... [T]he rehabilitation goal must be balanced against other interests,
including the need to recognize the rights of creditors.").
109 See, e.g., Samuel L. Bufford, Chapter 11 Case Management and Delay Reduction: An
Empirical Study, 4 Am. BANKR. INsr. L. REv. 85, 103 (1996) ("The traditionally recognized
purpose of filing a chapter 11 case is to reorganize the finances of the debtor by means of a
chapter 11 plan."); id. at 103 n.82 ("By the traditional measure, the confirmation of a
chapter 11 plan constitutes success under chapter 11."); LoPucki & Whitford, supra note
88, at 599 ("Bankruptcy lawyers and commentators sometimes consider a reorganization
case to be successful if a plan of reorganization has been confirmed."); David P. Bart &
Scott Peltz, Rethinking the Concept of "Success" in Bankruptcy and Corporate Recovery, Am. BANKR.
INsr. J. (Am. Bankr. Inst., Wash. D.C.), May 1998, at 1, 37 ("The emerging data suggests a
far greater chance of 'success,' as narrowly defined by chapter 11 confirmations, than was
suggested in previous studies."); Lisa Hill Fenning, Mediation, Not Litigation, Am. BANKR.
INsT. J. (Am. Bankr. Inst., Wash. D.C.),July/Aug. 1996, at 35, 36 ("Success in chapter 11 is
... typically defined as a confirmed consensual plan of reorganization."). Moreover, both
Congress and the Supreme Court have adopted triggers within Chapter 11 based on the
reasonable likelihood that a court will confirm a Chapter 11 plan within a reasonable time.
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (2)-(3) (2000); United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest As-
socs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 376 (1988).
110 Judge Bufford is among these commentators. In his 1994 article, he writes:
There is a basic misconception about the success rate of Chapter 11 cases
.. . [because of] a perversely narrow view of the nature of Chapter 11
success.
Defining success in Chapter 11 requires much more analysis and de-
bate than it has heretofore received. As a first approximation, I propose
that success be defined as the achievement of the results sought, or the
avoidance of the results unwanted, by the debtor at the time of filing. For
example, the debtor may want to sell the business, because the debtor can-
not make it profitable. After the filing, a sale is arranged and the case is
dismissed. Alternatively, the debtor may be attempting to avoid foreclosure
by the principal secured creditor on the principal real estate asset in the
bankruptcy estate. The loan is restructured, or a sale is arranged to a bet-
ter-financed purchaser, and the case is dismissed.
Results of this kind are common in Chapter 11 cases, and frequently
occur in single-asset real estate cases, even though they do not comply with
bankruptcy theory. However, such cases are all excluded from the tally of
successful Chapter 11 cases, according to the conventional counting
method.
The real success rate for Chapter 11 cases is probably in the range of
40%. This estimate is based on my experience with nearly 2000 Chapter 11
cases that have been on my docket: no data have been collected on this
subject.
Bufford, supra note 63, at 833-34 (footnotes omitted); see also Warren, supra note 36, at 377
(noting that a high proportion of Chapter 11 case liquidations does not indicate that the
bankruptcy system is failing).
111 Some commentators contend that "success" should only apply to those cases in
which the debtor obtained confirmation of a plan and continued in business. See, e.g.,
LoPucki, supra note 102, at 107 ("[T]he term 'success' will be applied only to proceedings
in which the debtor both obtained confirmation of a plan and was able to continue in
business .... "); LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 88, at 600 ("One measure of this kind of
success is whether the surviving entity remained out of bankruptcy after confirmation.").
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of all successful Chapter 11 cases. These commentators might con-
tend that my data counts many failures as successes if the refiling rate
is high for the SARE debtors in my data sets.112 Other commentators
might counter that the Bankruptcy Code favors confirmation of a plan
and does not condemn refilings such that the refiling data are periph-
eral to my study.113 This Article does not engage in the debate over
defining "success" in Chapter 11 bankruptcies. Instead, it measures
confirmation of plans in Chapter 11, which is the benchmark adopted
by Congress.
Most Chapter 11 debtors file for relief under Chapter 11 with the
objective of confirming a Chapter 11 plan. A confirmed plan can
restructure secured and unsecured indebtedness, provide for sale or
rehabilitation of the property, or permit the secured lender to fore-
close. The outcome is usually consensual, reflecting the will of the
parties to preserve value for each particular SARE project. Occasion-
ally, the parties cannot agree on a consensual plan and the court
grants the mortgage holder's request for relief from a stay," 4 dis-
misses the case, or converts it to a Chapter 7 case. 115 Very rarely, the
court confirms a "cramdown" plan over the dissent of the mortgage
holder following a determination that the plan is "fair and equita-
ble."" 6 For the most part, the universe of SARE cases with confirmed
Chapter 11 plans will reflect a conservative measure of success."
17
Thus, these commentators would exclude liquidating plans or plans that result in the
debtor refiling for bankruptcy from the category of successful Chapter 11 cases.
112 See LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 88, at 235 ("Refiling constitutes a failure of the
bankruptcy process.").
113 See Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Whither the Race? A Comment on the
Effects of the Delawarization of Corporate Reorganizations, 54 VAD. L. REv. 283, 293-95 (2001)
(arguing that the Bankruptcy Code does not condemn refilings and that they are not
costly). See generally Wh7tat Other Scholars Think of the LoPucki/Kalin Study, BANta. CT. DECI-
SIONS WKLY. NEws & CoummNr, Aug. 8, 2000, at A7 (reviewing academic reactions to the
study).
114 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)-(f) (2000).
115 See id. § 1112(b).
116 See id. § 1129(b). See generally Kenneth N. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About
Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 Am. BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979) (discussing the
process by which courts confirm cramdown plans). Some might argue that a nonconsen-
sual plan is unsuccessful because it diverts value from secured creditors. See supra note 50
and accompanying text. It also is possible in some cases for a creditor to propose a con-
firmable Chapter 11 plan. See, e.g., In reHolley Garden Apartments, Ltd., 238 B.R. 488, 492
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999) (noting that both the debtor's and creditor's plans were confirma-
ble). Therefore in some respects confirmation of a SARE plan could be overinclusive of
"success."
117 But see sources cited supra note 111 (contending that some commentators measure
confirmation success by whether the debtor survives and does not refile for bankruptcy,
and that even if confirmation is not dispositive of success, it is certainly relevant to assessing
success). Some commentators, however, adopt the view that state law foreclosure, with all
of its shortcomings, is preferable to any bankruptcy reorganization. See, e.g., supra notes
47-50 and accompanying text.
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If SARE cases were not likely to result in confirmed plans, then
Congress should have barred them entirely from the Chapter 11 sys-
tem instead of allowing debtors to file subject to an expedited proce-
dure. On the other hand, if there was a reasonable likelihood 1 8 that
SARE cases would produce confirmed plans, there would not appear
to be any principled reason to subject them to rules different from
those governing other kinds of Chapter 11 cases. The key is to iden-
tify those characteristics of SARE debtors that are good predictors of
confirmed plans. Then Congress would have an informed basis on
which to draw a line.
Based on my practical experience with SARE cases, I had hypoth-
esized that properties with larger property values and value-to-loan ra-
tios have a greater likelihood of confirmation. 19 To test these
hypotheses, I examined the National data to determine whether cer-
tain variables were indicative of increased likelihood of confirmation,
including the property value, the property value natural log, the value-
to-loan ratio (difference of natural logs) 120 and the like. The findings
regarding these variables were meaningful with a Pseudo R2 (Greene)
of .28,121 but I needed additional analysis of all data to determine the
validity of my hypotheses.
Analysis of the data reveals interesting patterns in SARE cases.
The National data reveal a strong relationship between property value
and confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan, a finding that the L.A. and
Combined data echo. This means that a judge is more likely to con-
firm a plan in a case with a very valuable property than in a case with
low-valued property. In fact, the observed data are consistent with this
prediction. Of the seventeen cases in the National data set that re-
sulted in confirmed plans, ten involved properties worth $8.2 million
or more. 122 On the other hand, only seven cases involved properties
worth less than $8.2 million. Stated another way, of the eighteen cases
in the upper 40th percentile of property value (valued at $7 million or
more), ten (56%) resulted in confirmed plans. Of the twenty-seven
cases in the lower 60th percentile (valued at $7 million or less), only
118 Reasonable minds can differ on the level of probability of confirmation that would
support fast-track rules that disadvantage SARE debtors. Congress is well situated to en-
gage in this kind of line-drawing. Figure 1, infra, presents the kind of data that gives Con-
gress an informed basis to do so.
119 In my experience, properties with larger values are also better maintained and
more current in payment of real property taxes than properties with smaller values. I
tested the data for these effects as well.
120 One can calculate a value-to-loan ratio by dividing the property value by the unpaid
loan balance. For example, a property worth $10 million subject to a $5 million loan bal-
ance will have a value-to-loan ratio of 2:1.
121 See WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYsis 651 (2d ed. 1993). For a general
explanation of pseudo R2 and other statistical measures, see infra note 154.
122 See infra Figure 2.
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seven (26%) resulted in confirmed plans. 123 At the extremes, the data
are even more striking: Chart 1 shows that of the nine cases in the
lowest quintile, only one (11%) resulted in a confirmed plan, whereas
of the nine cases in the highest quintile, six (67%) resulted in con-
firmed plans. Thus, based on the raw data, it appears that somewhere
between $7 million and $8.2 million in property value there is a flex-
ion point above which the likelihood of confirmation increases
substantially.
CHART I
NATIONAL DATA SET PERCENT CONFIRMED CHAPTER 11 PLANS BY
QUINTILE BASED ON PROPERTY VALUE IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
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The L.A. data, shown in Chart 2, involve more properties with
lower property values. Of the sixteen cases in the lowest quintile, only
one (6%) resulted in a confirmed plan, whereas six (38%) of the six-
teen cases in the highest quintile resulted in a confirmed plan. The
second through fourth quintiles show no clear pattern with confirma-
tion rates of 20%, 7%, and 13% respectively.
Dissecting the highest quintile of the L.A. data, however, reveals a
flexion point similar to that reflected in the National data. Chart 3
shows that of the seven cases with property values between $5.8 mil-
lion and $7.0 million, only one (14%) resulted in a confirmed plan,
whereas five (56%) of the nine cases with property values of at least
$8.5 million resulted in confirmed plans. Thus the L.A. data also sup-
port the inference that somewhere between $7 million and $8.2 mil-
lion in property value there is a flexion point above which the
likelihood of confirmation increases substantially.
The finding with respect to SARE Chapter 11 cases is consistent
with the understanding of Chapter 11 generally. Larger companies
are more likely to end their Chapter 11 cases with a successful reor-
123 See id. I have included properties valued at $7 million in both the lower 60th per-
centile and in the upper 40th percentile.
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CHART 2
L.A. DATA SET PERCENT CONFIRMED CHAPTER 11 PLANS BY QUINTILE
BASED ON PROPERTY VALUE IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
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ganization. 124 This finding may reflect the relatively high expenses of
a Chapter 11 reorganization. In effect, only larger cases can afford
the expenses of a reorganization in addition to the expenses of oper-
ating the property. Smaller cases may be as complex as larger ones,125
but if they cannot afford to continue operations126 and bear the ad-
ministrative costs of the Chapter 11 process,1 27 they may not survive.
The National data also reflect a strong relationship between the
value-to-loan ratio and the likelihood of confirmation of a Chapter 11
plan, a finding on which the L.A. and Combined data are inconclu-
sive. The National data suggest, consistent with my experience and
hypothesis, that cases with less leveraged capital structures are more
likely to confirm Chapter 11 plans. But the L.A. and Combined data's
inconclusive support for this proposition demonstrates the danger of
drawing conclusions based on shared experience and anecdotal testi-
mony without adequate empirical research.
Examining raw historical data is only a beginning. This Article
presents a model that forecasts the likelihood of confirmation based
on historical relationships embedded in the data set. I selected prop-
erty values and value-to-loan ratios as key independent variables
124 See Warren & Westbrook, supra note 85, at 500 ("Because the complex structural
apparatus of Chapter 11 ... is based on a prototype of a business with sufficiently large
assets and debt to support an expensive restructuring, the businesses in Chapter 11 should
be relatively large."); see also LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 88, at 255 (noting the extremely
high confirmation rate for large public companies from 1989 until 1997); LoPucki & Whit-
ford, supra note 88, at 600 (reporting a 96% confirmation rate for large public companies).
125 See Gose Testimony, supra note 78 ("I can state categorically that size does not bear
any relation to complexity. In fact, it is not unusual for a smaller transaction to be more
complex than a larger; with less to fight over, more wrinkles may arise.").
126 See LoPucki, supra note 102, at 107 & n.32; see also Kerkman, supra note 106, at 167
("[Between 74% and 76%] of the operating businesses entering Chapter 11 proceedings
were destined to fail .... ).
127 Chapter 11 administrative costs include attorney's fees, accountant's fees, ap-
praiser's fees, court fees, postpetition taxes, and the like. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2000).
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CHART 3
L.A. DATA SET PERCENT CONFIRMED CHAPTER 11 PLANS: GROUPINGS
BASED ON PROPERTY VALUE IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
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against which I could predict the likelihood of a plan's confirmation.
Because confirmation is a dichotomous variable-in that it either oc-
curs or does not occur-I assigned the value "1" to a case with a plan
that was confirmed and "0" to a case where a plan was not confirmed.
To understand more clearly the relationship between value-to-loan ra-
tios, property values, and probability of confirmation, I first plotted
value-to-loan ratios and property values against probability of confir-
mation. No clear relationship emerged; it was not possible to find a
meaningful line around which the data would cluster. By using a lo-
gistic regression, 128 however, the relationships crystallized in a model
that predicts the likelihood of confirmation. 129 That is, given a partic-
ular property value and value-to-loan ratio, the model illustrated in
Figure 1 forecasts this likelihood of confirmation. 130
The National data model reflected in Figure 1 shows that both
property value and value-to-loan ratios are good predictors of confir-
mation.131 For example, although the National model predicts that
courts will confirm plans involving properties with a value of $1 mil-
lion and loans that are twice the property value (1:2) about 2% of the
time, it shows that courts are twenty times more likely to confirm ex-
pensive ($20 million) properties with the same loan ratio (40%).132
128 Logistic regression is a statistical procedure that is useful for predicting dichoto-
mous outcomes, in which the dependent variable can have only two possible values (typi-
cally 0 or 1); the predictors can be either continuous or categorical. The relationship
between these variables is more clearly understood if we view the distribution of predicted
confirmations in a two-way table. See infra Appendix Table 1. It appears that both property
value and value-to-loan ratios are good predictors of which cases courts will confirm, but
that property value may be more sensitive to which cases courts will eventually confirm.
129 See infra Figure 1; infra Appendix Table 1.
130 Figure 1, infra, suggests more precision in the relationships than a data set with
forty-five observations warrants. Nevertheless, it properly illustrates the direction of the
relationships.
131 See infra Appendix Table 2.
132 See supra Figure 1; infra Appendix Table 1.
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FIGURE 1
NATIONAL MODEL: PREDICTED RATE OF CONFIRMATION BY
PROPERTY VALUE AND VALUE-TO-LOAN RATIO
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Those with both a high value and a high value-to-loan ratio are almost
certainly confirmed (95%).133 The National model indicates that
both the property value and value-to-loan ratio are good predictors of
confirmation.
The L.A. and Combined data provide strong support for the rela-
tionship generated from the National data between property value
and probability of plan confirmation.1 3 4 But the L.A. and Combined
data are inconclusive regarding the relationship between the value-to-
loan ratio and the probability of plan confirmation. 13 5 The L.A. and
Combined data suggest that property value may be more sensitive
than the value-to-loan ratio in predicting confirmation. 13 6 As a result,
I focused on the property value data alone as a predictor of
confirmation.
The National model and data strongly suggest that property value
is predictive of confirmation in SARE Chapter 11 cases. Thus, prop-
erty value is a particularly good predictor of the probability that a
court will confirm a Chapter 11 plan in a SARE case. 137 Figure 2 dem-
133 See supra Figure 1; infra Appendix Table 1.
134 See infra Appendix Table 2.
135 See id.
136 See id.
137 The Wald statistics are set forth in Appendix Table 2, infra. For a more thorough
discussion of the statistical methods, see infra Appendix A.
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100%
80%
FIGURE 2
NATIONAL MODEL: PROBABILITY OF SARE PLAN
CONFIRMATION BY VALUE OF PROPERTY
*+
++.
+
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onstrates the fit for the National data using a logarithmic axis for
property value and symbols to indicate confirmation.
These data may also be tabulated as in Chart 4:
CIHART 4
NATIONAL MODEL: PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF CONFIRMATION
BASED ON PROPERTY VALUE
Property Value(S Millions) 1 3 5 10 15 20 30 50
Probability of
Confirmation 9% 23% 32% 46% 55% 61% 69% 78%
These data justify raising the SARE cap to a property value of about
$10 million. At that level, confirmation is almost an even bet. At the
$20 million level, the likelihood of confirmation is about 60%.
Figure 3 reflects the relationship between property value and
probability of confirmation without using a logarithmic scale or in-
cluding symbolic representation of confirmation.
These figures illustrating the National model support my hypoth-
esis that SARE cases with larger properties have a good chance of hay-
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FIGURE 3
NATIONAL MODEL: PROBABILITY OF PLAN CONFIRMATION
BY PROPERTY VALUE
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ing a Chapter 11 plan confirmed. 13 8 More importantly, they clearly
show that a "one-size" Chapter 11 process does not fit all SARE cases,
at least where the one-size procedure does not afford all debtors a
reasonable opportunity to reorganize. 139
Not having made a similar investigation, Congress engaged in its
process unaware of such information. Congress listened to the lend-
ers who lobbied for the bill and the House and Senate each passed
bills blowing up the $4 million cap. The resulting decision reflected
in the 2001 Amendment was a shot in the dark that missed the mark.
IV
LESSONS FROM APPLYING THE DATA TO THE
2001 AMENDMENT
As a policy matter, Congress blundered when it proposed to re-
peal the $4 million cap in the definition of SARE debtors. The 2001
Amendment would expose larger SARE debtors to the strictures of the
newly expanded § 362(d) (3) of the Bankruptcy Code. To survive the
Chapter 11 process, they would have to file a confirmable Chapter 11
plan within ninety days of the order for relief, persuade the court to
extend that time, or start making payments to their mortgage holders
138 The L.A. and Combined data generally reinforce this hypothesis.
139 Before 1994, under the Bankruptcy Code, one size fit all SARE cases precisely be-
cause the one size was the general, flexible reorganization rule applicable to almost all
Chapter 11 debtors.
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based on nondefault interest under the contract. 40 This recipe
would give secured mortgage holders effective control of the SARE
Chapter 11 case. These lenders will have obtained what they paid for
to the detriment of the property owners, the unsecured creditors, and
the general public. Congress should have proposed a less restrictive
alternative that would have better served and harmonized the compet-
ing interests in SARE Chapter 11 cases.
Congress could have adopted the position of law-and-economics
critics that Chapter 11 is inefficient and should be replaced by an auc-
tion system 141 or abolished altogether. 142 But Congress has elected to
retain the Chapter 11 system for most debtors, including SARE debt-
ors. By most accounts, the mark of success under the Chapter 11 sys-
tem is, at the very least, confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan.143 Thus,
140 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, H.R. 333, 107th Cong. § 444, available at http:/
/thomas.loc.gov; Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420, 107th Cong. § 444, available at
http://thomas.loc.gov.
141 See Baird & Morrison, supra note 48, at 369, 371. Baird and Morrison advocate for
such a system:
In a mandatory auction regime, managers of firms that have value as going
concerns will do everything they can to make this information readily avail-
able at the start of the case. They will keep their jobs only if a single buyer
of the assets can be found, and the chances of finding such a buyer go up
the more such information is available....
. Only a system of mandatory auctions both limits the amount of
time an inexpert decision maker handles the shutdown option and forces
insiders to give that decision maker sufficient information to exercise the
option well while it is in her hands.
Id.; see also Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD.
127, 145 (1986) (criticizing bankruptcy law as not reflective of market preferences); Lucian
Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARv. L. REv. 775, 778-81
(1988) (noting same).
142 See, e.g., Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11,
101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1078 (1992) ("Chapter 11 should be repealed, abolishing court-supervised
corporate reorganizations and, in effect, precluding residual claimants from participating in any reor-
ganization of thefirm.... [Mie propose a federal law repealing Chapter 11 ... and provid-
ing for automatic cancellation of residual claims in the event of default." (emphasis in
original)).
143 See sources cited supra note 109. But see, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncon-
tested Axioms, 108 YALE LJ. 573, 584 (1998) ("Chapter 11 cannot be judged merely by
counting the number of firms that reorganize successfully... [T] he rehabilitation goal
must be balanced against other interests, including the need to recognize the rights of
creditors."); Bufford, supra note 63, at 833. Judge Bufford writes:
As a first approximation, I propose that success be defined as the achieve-
ment of the results sought, or the avoidance of the results unwanted, by the
debtor at the time of filing. For example, the debtor may want to sell the
business, because the debtor cannot make it profitable. After the filing, a
sale is arranged and the case is dismissed....
... However, such cases are all excluded from the tally of successful
Chapter 11 cases, according to the conventional counting method.
Id.; Steven H. Ancel & Bruce A. Markell, Hope in the Heartland: Chapter 11 Dispositions in
Indiana and Southern Illinois, 1990-1996, 50 S.C. L. REv. 343, 357 (1999) ("The conse-
quences outlined above hint at a definition of success ... that is broader than simply
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the question addressed in this Article is not whether the law should
permit SARE debtors to reorganize under Chapter 11, but under what
conditions SARE debtors may reorganize.
In 1994, Congress established a separate procedure for small
SARE debtors with secured debts not exceeding $4 million. Since
then, nothing has happened to warrant applying the separate SARE
procedure to larger cases. In fact, instead of conducting diligent legis-
lative facffinding as it had done on other occasions, Congress gath-
ered no empirical data to analyze larger SARE cases. Instead, it chose
to receive anecdotal testimony144 and money from mortgage holders'
lobbyists.1 45 As this Article demonstrates, the data strongly support
the proposition that larger SARE cases have a high likelihood of con-
firming Chapter 11 plans. The same may be true of cases with high
value-to-loan ratios. Repealing the $4 million cap so as to subject all
SARE debtors to the requirements of § 362(d) (3) of the Bankruptcy
Code probably will reduce the likelihood of confirmation for several
large SARE debtors. By some standards, this will diminish the success
of Chapter 11, thereby adding fuel to the fire of the commentators
who call for Chapter 1l's repeal.
By drawing a reasonable line to differentiate small SARE debtors
from large SARE debtors, Congress could have preserved the eco-
nomic braking function of Chapter 11 in preventing uncontrolled
downward spirals in real estate prices when mortgage holders simulta-
neously dump numerous foreclosed properties on the market. 14 6 It is
important to recall that this system benefits society by guarding the
economic health of institutions that finance real property, in addition
to the financial well-being of the property owners. 147 In fact, instead
of drawing a line based on the amount of secured debt, Congress
might have done better to consider property value and the value-to-
loan ratio instead. As Appendix Table 1 illustrates, even SARE cases
with $1 million in property value have a 39% chance of confirmation
when the value-to-loan ratio is 2:1.148 Quite clearly, the data support a
more textured look at these cases. Indeed, the data raise the question
confirming a Chapter 11 plan.... [T] he authors believe a rough definition of a successful
Chapter 11 is one in which all participants receive more than they would have if liquida-
tion had been initiated.").
144 See sources cited supra notes 78, 80.
145 See Bankruptcy, supra note 15.
146 If dumping small SARE properties on the market causes a downward spiral, then
drawing a line to insulate large SARE debtors from the restrictions of § 362(d) (3) will not
suffice. To prevent the spiral, Congress would need to repeal § 362(d) (3).
147 See supra notes 67-68, 71 and accompanying text.
148 See infra Appendix Table 1. Although the National data support using value-to-loan
ratios as indicative of the probability of confirming a SARE plan, the L.A. and Combined
data are inconclusive on this point. See infra Appendix Table 2.
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whether the law should use debt levels alone as an eligibility limitation
for any purpose under the Bankruptcy Code.
Moreover, the case in favor of drawing a reasonable line is com-
pelling. As noted above, the National model uses confirmation of a
Chapter 11 plan as a surrogate for success.' 49 However, many com-
mentators acknowledge that confirmation is only part of the measure
of success. 150 Some SARE Chapter 11 cases that resulted in dismissals
were undoubtedly the product of negotiated settlements. If the 2001
Amendment is enacted into law, however, as it becomes more difficult
to confirm plans, there will be less reason for a mortgage lender to
negotiate a reasonable settlement. Hence, with this change in the law,
both the visible and the invisible successes in SARE Chapter 11 cases
will be less likely to occur.
CONCLUSION
The data strongly support the application of the more relaxed
current Chapter 11 procedures in larger SARE cases where the
probability of confirmation is high. There is no rational justification
for stuffing valuable properties with high values (or possibly high
value-to-loan ratios)151 into an expedited SARE procedure that will al-
most surely decrease the confirmation rate. 152 Policymakers reasona-
bly can disagree about whether they should draw a line at a property
value of $5 million, where the probability of confirmation is 32%, $10
million, where the probability of confirmation climbs to 46%, or $15
149 See supra note 109.
150 See LoPucki & Kahn, supra note 88, at 235.
151 Based on the lack of statistical significance in the L.A. and Combined data sets, I
would require more data to determine definitively the relationship between value-to-loan
ratios and the likelihood of confirmation.
152 I did not elicit comprehensive data regarding the length of time it took debtors to
confirm Chapter 11 plans in large SARE cases. Based on my experience, however, most
large SARE cases require more than ninety days to confirm a plan of reorganization. Some
of these cases have operating problems that parties in interest must fix before they reasona-
bly can predict the earning potential of the reorganized debtor and use it to negotiate a
plan. Other cases involve debtors with complex capital structures, tax issues, foreign lend-
ers, and the like, which delay the plan negotiation and confirmation process. If the 2001
Amendment becomes law, some SARE debtors will fall to reorganize as a result of exposure
to the expedited procedures. Others will reorganize on a different basis than they would
have before the adoption of the 2001 Amendment as a result of value being shifted from
owners and unsecured creditors to secured lenders. A few large SARE debtors may reor-
ganize in a more expeditious fashion than they would have before the adoption of the
2001 Amendment. Indeed, based on their previous writings, some commentators might
argue that expedition would lead to higher confirmation rates and no lower rate of busi-
ness survival. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 102, at 100-01 (noting that under Chapter XI of
the Bankruptcy Act, shorter proceedings probably resulted in a higher confirmation rate
than under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and no lower rate of business survival);
Lynn M. LoPucki, Tlw Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code? (pt. 2), 57 Azi. BANKR. LJ. 247, 269-71 (1983). One would need to conduct addi-
tional empirical research to quantify the results.
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million, where the probability of confirmation is even better, at 55%.
But it is plain that any line should be drawn based on consideration of
actual data, not on a shortcut rule that treats all SARE debtors less
favorably than other Chapter 11 debtors. If a $50 million property has
a 78% chance of confirming a plan under existing law, what policy
possibly justifies jamming it into an expedited procedure that might
jeopardize this result?153 Whether Congress should draw that line at
$4 million in secured debt, or at $7.4 million, $20 million, or some
different amount of property value, is an issue about which reasonable
people can disagree, but it is clear that a line should be drawn.
Congress used a meat axe when it should have used a scalpel.
Perhaps before Congress completes its deliberations on bankruptcy
reform legislation, it will reinstitute a reasonable SARE cap. This Arti-
cle and similar studies should serve to sharpen the debate.
153 Commentators disagree whether expedition of the Chapter 11 process will reduce
the plan confirmation rate. See supra note 152.
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APPENDIX A: STATISTICAL METHODS
As noted above, logistic regression is a statistical procedure that is
useful for predicting dichotomous outcomes, in which the dependent
variable can have only two possible values (typically 0 or 1); the
predictors can be either continuous or categorical. In this study, the
dependent variable is whether the court confirmed the plan. It is
coded "1" if there was confirmation, and "0" if there was no confirma-
tion. Both of the independent variables (Value of Property and Value-
to-Loan ratio) are continuous.
The logistic regression coefficients reported in Appendix Table 2
are exponents, the natural logs of the odds ratio (In (p/l-p)). Unlike
ordinary least-squares coefficients, one cannot interpret logistic coeffi-
cients independently of the model within which they are nested. 54
That is, the entire model is a function that one must calculate in order
to determine the effect of an individual independent variable. For
this purpose, we can restate the regression as follows:
Log Odds of Confirmation = -2.10 + (Value of Property x 1.11) +
(Value-to-Loan ratio x 2.37).
154 G. David Garson describes R2 and pseudo R2 statistics as follows:
* R-squared. There is no widely-accepted direct analog to OLS regression's
R2 . This is because an RF measure seeks to make a statement about the
"percent of variance explained," but the variance of a dichotomous or cate-
gorical dependent variable depends on the frequency distribution of that
variable. For a dichotomous dependent variable, for instance, variance is at
a maximum for a 50-50 split and the more lopsided the split, the lower the
variance. This means that R-squared measures for logistic regressions with
differing marginal distributions of their respective dependent variables can-
not be compared directly, and comparison of logistic R-squared measures
with R2 from OLS regression is also problematic. Nonetheless, a number of
logistic R-squared measures have been proposed. Note that R2-like mea-
sures below are not goodness-of-fit tests but rather attempt to measure
srength [sic] of association. For small samples, for instance, an R2-like mea-
sure might be high when goodness of fit was unacceptable by model chi-
square or some other test.
[*I Cox and Snell's R-Square is an attempt to imitate the interpretation of
multiple R-Square based on the likelihood, but its maximum can be (and
usually is) less than 1.0, making it difficult to interpret. It is part of SPSS
output.
[e] Nagelkerke's R-Square is a further modification of the Cox and Snell
coefficient to assure that it can vary from 0 to 1. That is, Nagelkerke's RF
divides Cox and Snell's R2 by its maximum in order to achieve a measure
that ranges from 0 to 1. Therefore Nagelkerke's R-Square will normally be
higher than the Cox and Snell measure. It is part of SPSS output.
[e] Pseudo-R-square is a [sic] Aldrich and Nelson's coefficient which serves
as an analog to the squared contingency coefficient, with an interpretation
like R-square. Its maximum is less than 1. It may be used in either dichoto-
mous or multinomial logistic regression.
See G. DAVID GARSON, Logistic Regression, in PA 765 STATNOTES: AN ONLINE TEXTooK, at
http://vv2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/logistic.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2002) (cita-
tion omitted).
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In order to recover the probability of confirmation for a given prop-
erty or type of property, one would add the values into the equation
above, raise Euler's constant (e) to the resulting value, and then calcu-
late the odds.
For example, assume that the property is fully mortgaged; the
value-to-loan ratio (which is the difference between the logged values)
is equal to 0. This allows us to see what happens as the value of prop-
erty varies. The value-of-property variable comprises the logged values
of the properties, in millions of dollars, so that a value of 1 in the
variable is equal to $2.72 million in the real world; a value of 2 is equal
to $7.39 million, and so on. If we use the National data set and select
1 as the value of property, we would get the following equation:
Log Odds of Confirmation = -2.10 + 1 x 1.11 = -0.99
Odds = E-° '99 = .37:1.
Once we compute the odds, we generate probability by dividing the
odds by one plus the odds:
Probability of confirmation = .37 / 1.37 = .27 or 27%.
Now let us assume a property with the same value-to-loan ratio of 0,
but a value of property variable value of 2 (an actual property value of
$7.39 million). We would state the equation for the National data set
as follows:
Log Odds of Confirmation - -2.10 + 2 x 1.11 = .12
Odds = E 12 = 1.13:1
Probability of Confirmation = 1.13 / 2.13 = .53 or 53%.
We understand more clearly the relationship between these prop-
erty value and value-to-loan ratio variables if we view the distribution
of predicted confirmations in a two-way table (Appendix Table 1).
The numbers illustrate how both the property value and the value-to-
loan ratio appear to be important factors underlying the confirmation
decisions of bankruptcy courts. The model predicts confirmation
about 2% of the time of plans involving properties with a value of $1
million and loans that are twice the property value (1:2); and predicts
confirmation of plans for expensive ($20 million) properties with the
same debt ratio as twenty times more likely (40%). Confirmation of
plans involving properties with both a high value and a high value-to-
loan ratio is almost certain (95%). Therefore it appears that both
value and loan ratios are good predictors of confirmation failure, but
that value may be more sensitive for predicting confirmation.
To understand the relationship between the property value, the
value-to-loan ratio, and the probability of confirmation from a differ-
ent perspective, consider Figure 1 above. This figure clearly shows a
substantial likelihood of confirmation when the property value is at
least $7.4 million and the value-to-loan ratio exceeds 1:1.5. In fact,
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APPENDIX TABLE 1
NATIONAL MODEL: PREDICTED RATE OF CONFIRMATION BY PROPERTY
VALUE AND VALuE-TO-LOAN RATIO
Ratio of Property Value-to-Loan Principal
Property Value 1:2 1:1.5 1:1 1.5:1 2:1
$1 million 2% 4% 11% 24% 39%
$2.7 million 7% 12% 27% 50% 66%
$7.4 million 18% 30% 53% 75% 85%
$20 million 40% 56% 77% 90% 95%
Note: Entries are the percentage of cases within the cell that are predicted to be confirmed.
using that value-to-loan ratio, if the property value exceeds $20 mil-
lion, confirmation is more probable than not.
APPENDIX TABLE 2
FACTORS OF BANKRUPTCY PLAN CONFIRvATION IN SARE CASES
Data Source
National L.A. Combined
Property Valuet 1.11"* .52* .73**
(8.53) (3.55) (13.60)
(mean 1. 72, sd 1.26) (mean .51, sd 1.20) (mean .95, sd 1.35)
Value-to-Loan Ratiot 2.37* -. 68 -. 09
(5.28) (1.84) (.08)
(mean -. 27, sd .51) (mean .31, sd .77) (mean .10, sd .74)
Constant -2.10** -1.82** -2.02**
(7.40) (19.58) (29.46)
Pseudo-R .42 .13 .20
N 45 76 121
*p <.05, ** p <.01
t Property value is the natural log of the assessed value in millions of dollars. Value-to-loan ratio
is the difference in the natural logs of the property value and the outstanding loan amount in
millions of dollars.
Note: Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients. Wald statistics are in parentheses.
As noted above, the National data predict the probability of con-
firmation both as a function of property value and value-to-loan ratio.
By contrast, as illustrated by Appendix Table 2, the L.A. and Com-
bined data support the relationship only for property value, but not
for value-to-loan ratio. The L.A. data thus make the National data on
property value more robust despite the lack of a random sample and a
small number of cases, but undermine the National data's implica-
tions for value-to-loan ratio. Appendix Table 2 also uses Wald statis-
tics 155 to show the tighter fit for property value data versus value-to-
loan data. Note that Appendix Table 2 uses Wald statistics instead of
155 Id. ("Computationally, the Wald statistic = b2 / ASEb2 where ASEb2 is the asymptotic
variance of the logistic regression coefficient."). Garson further explains the Wald statistic:
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standard errors, but Wald statistics derive from standard errors and
take into account the number of cases, making them as good or better
than standard errors for measuring goodness of fit.
Figures 2 and 3, above, demonstrate the effect of isolating the
analysis of the National data set to focus on probability of confirma-
tion based on property value alone.
The Wald statistic is commonly used to test the significance of individual
logistic regression coefficients for each independent variable (that is, to test
the null hypothesis in logistic regression that a particular logit (effect) coef-
ficient is zero). It is the ratio of the unstandardized logit coefficient to its
standard error. The Wald statistic is part of SPSS output in the section
"Variables in the Equation." Of course, one looks at the corresponding
significance level rather than the Wald statistic itself....
• . . Also note that the Wald statistic is sensitive to violations of the
large-sample assumption of logistic regression.
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APPENDIX B: SINGLE ASSET REAL ESTATE (SARE) QUESTIONNAIRE
Please duplicate this Questionnaire and fill out a copy for each single
asset real estate deal you have done since October 1, 1979. Please
return the completed questionnaires to Professor Ken Klee, UCLA
Law School, P.O. Box 951476, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476 as soon as
possible but in no event later than March 13, 1998.
1. Type of Property (Apartment Building, Raw Land, etc.)
2. Valuation Range of Property
3. Type of Settlement: Out of Court __; Cramdown __ ; Consen-
sual Plan
4. Were maintenance and taxes current pre-workout or prepetition?
(Y/N)
5. Terms of Debt/Settlement:
A. Senior Secured Creditor with Mortgage or Deed of Trust on
Real Estate
Priority of Lien: (Should be First; Indicate if any subordination) _
Amount of debt? (Pre and Post Workout or Plan)
Interest Rate? (Pre and Post Workout or Plan)
Term? (Pre and Post Workout or Plan)
Other Relevant Information
B. Junior Secured Creditor with Mortgage or Deed of Trust on
Real Estate
Priority
Amount of debt? (Pre and Post Workout or Plan)
Interest Rate? (Pre and Post Workout or Plan)
Term? (Pre and Post Workout or Plan)
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Other Relevant Information
C. Other Secured Creditor
Priority
Amount of debt? (Pre and Post Workout or Plan)
Interest Rate? (Pre and Post Workout or Plan)
Term? (Pre and Post Workout or Plan)
Other Relevant Information
Debtor (Identify the Debtor if the information is Not Confidential):
New or Retained Equity
New Capital Infused
Management Contracts, Salaries, or Other Private Benefits
Debt Forgiven
Relevant Information
